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ABSTRACT
Organizational researchers are increasingly interested in how organizations are
perceived by their constituents, because such perceptions have important implications for
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and organizational outcomes. In this twoessay dissertation, I focus on a specific type of social approval asset, celebrity – the
extent to which a social actor attains high levels of public attention and elicits positive
emotional responses. Specifically, I examine how celebrity emerges at different
organizational levels.
In Essay 1, I first develop a theoretical multilevel framework of business
celebrity, building on agenda setting theory and framing theory. Second, I propose a
typology of business celebrity based on the different types of media narratives that foster
its creations at different organizational levels. Third, I develop a set of theoretically
driven propositions to examine contingency factors under which specific types of media
causal attributions are more likely to emerge.
In Essay 2, I empirically test under what conditions celebrity is more likely to
emerge at the CEO or organizational level. On a sample of U.S. firms and CEOs from the
Fortune 500 and the Unicorns lists, I investigate the role of organizational competitive
actions, temporal information and communication materials in determining the
development of celebrity at different organizational levels.
Taken together the two essays examine the media attributional processes behind
the development of individual and organizational celebrity. Specifically, this dissertation
proposes theoretical arguments and empirical tests to suggest that individual and
organizational celebrity emerge as journalists develop causal attributions about business
events, and imprint those attributions in their reporting about organizational life.
Moreover, the development of individual and organizational celebrity can be
characterized as a frame dispute affected by not only the media understanding of specific
events, but also by the agency exerted by organizations and their members in promoting
specific interpretative frames, through communication materials.
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INTRODUCTION
Constituents’ perceptions of organizations have important implications for
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and organizational outcomes (Rindova,
Pollock, & Hayward, 2006). Consequently, a substantial body of research has developed
within organizational studies, to identify how these perceptions are formed and to
investigate how they affect organizational processes and outcomes (e.g.: Graffin, Bundy,
Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013b; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Rindova et al.,
2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard, 2016b).
Social approval assets are a special category of intangible resources that derive
their value from the favorable collective perceptions associated with them (Pfarrer,
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Information intermediaries, such as the media, play a
fundamental role in determining how these perceptions are formed and how they evolve
over time (Deephouse, 2000; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006). One important
type of social approval asset is celebrity. Celebrities are social actors that attract high
levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses from the public
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In modern societies, celebrity is a product of
mass communication (Boorstin, 1961; Gamson, 1992; Rein, Kotler, & Stoller, 1987;
Rindova et al., 2006) and, within the business context, it can emerge at both the
individual (Hayward et al., 2004) and the organizational level (Rindova et al., 2006), as
the media develop “dramatized realities” (Rindova et al., 2006: 50) in their reporting
about organizational life and business events.
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Previous research has explored both antecedents and consequences of individual
(see Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen, Adams, & Shook, 2008;
Ranft, Ferris, & Perryman, 2007; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006, 2008) and
organizational celebrity, (see Kjærgaard, Morsing, & Ravasi, 2011; Perryman, 2008;
Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006). Emerging from these studies is an initial
understanding of how individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and an
appreciation of their distinctive effects on individual and organizational outcomes.
Overall, individual and organizational celebrity have been theorized to have
different, yet similar, development processes (see Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al.,
2006) as well as different effects on organizational outcomes (see Graffin, Pfarrer, &
Hill, 2012b; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006). Specifically, empirical evidence
demonstrates that the positive effect of CEO celebrity on organizational performance is
short lived, and in the long-term CEO celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational
returns (Wade et al., 2006), while organizational celebrity seems to have positive effects
on organizational performance, as it fosters the adoption by stakeholders of positive
affective frames towards the organization (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
Notwithstanding the growing body of literature on celebrity, this stream of
research suffers from two main limitations. First, researchers have focused most of the
empirical efforts to investigate the consequences of this important social approval asset,
disregarding for the most part the need to empirically test of the antecedents theoretically
identified as important for the achievement of celebrity. Second, notwithstanding the
evidences supporting the idea that individual and organizational celebrity may have
2

different implications for organizational outcomes, research on the two constructs has
proceeded mostly independently, hampering our understanding not only of how
individual and organizational celebrity are achieved respectively, but also of how they
co-evolve over time.
Addressing these gaps in the literature, I investigate the research question: why
and under what conditions do the media adopt the individual or organizational
attributional frames that foster the creation of individual and organizational celebrity
respectively? In Essay 1, I develop a multi-level model of business celebrity building on
the central role played by the media in disseminating the type of narratives needed to cast
a social actor as a celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In Essay 2, I
empirically investigate factors that affect the development of CEO and organizational
celebrity, respectively.
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, I aim to advance celebrity
theory by identifying how it emerges at different organizational levels. Second, I set to
understand how individual and organizational celebrity co-evolve by identifying how
multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over time, and with what performance
implications. Third, I provide an empirical test of the antecedents that the theory on
celebrity has identified as fostering the development of this important social approval
asset.
Specifically, in Essay 1, I take a constructivist approach (Gamson & Modigliani,
1994) and, building on framing theory (Entman, 1993), I theorize about factors that affect
the resonance of the individual or organizational attributional frames that, in combination
3

with positive affective frames, foster the development of individual or organizational
celebrity. I then identify possible co-evolution dynamics of celebrity across
organizational levels, and discuss specific performance advantages and disadvantages
that may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity, since such implications are
important in providing a picture of the complex ways in which different social approval
assets contribute to organizational performance.
Essay 1 provides multiple theoretical contributions. First, I contribute to the
literature on social approval assets by developing a multi-level model of business
celebrity that provides a more accurate picture of how media attention to organizations
and their members comes about, and how it develops over time. Second, by considering
how different forms of media narratives co-evolve over time, I contribute to celebrity
theory by exploring how celebrity dynamics can affect the sustainability of these social
approval assets over time. Lastly, by discussing performance implications of individual
and organizational celebrity, I contribute to the strategic management literature by
delineating the relationship between a combination of social approval assets and
organizational competitive advantage.
In Essay 2, an empirical study, I hypothesize and test empirically under what
conditions CEO and organizational celebrity are more likely to emerge. Specifically, I
suggest that organizational celebrity is more likely to occur when positively valued
competitive actions that are highly distinctive are undertaken in the presence of
organizational communication materials that are framed at the organizational level. On
the other hand, CEO celebrity is more likely to occur when positively charged
4

competitive actions that are highly distinctive are undertaken i) in the presence of
organizational communication materials that are framed at the CEO-level, iii) early on
during the tenure of a CEO, and iii) in the presence of a CEO that was also part of the
founding team. I test these hypotheses on a sample of 244 organizations from the Fortune
500 and the Unicorns lists, and find only partial support. Specifically, I find support for
the idea that the more the positive competitive actions undertaken by a company, the
greater the organizational celebrity. However, the distinctiveness of competitive actions
is does not moderate this mediation, while organizational communication materials
framed at the organizational level do. On the other hand, no support is found for the idea
that competitive actions foster the development of CEO celebrity, independently from
their level of distinctive, the frames in the organizational communication materials, and
the tenure of the CEO. However, when the CEO is also the founder, competitive actions
become relevant predictors of CEO celebrity.
In Essay 2, I provide multiple contributions to theory and practice. First, I
contribute to theory on celebrity by empirically testing the antecedences that have been
identified as leading to the development of this social approval asset. Second, I contribute
to the literature on celebrity by testing under what conditions celebrity emerges at the
individual or organizational level, respectively. Lastly, I contribute to the literature on
celebrity by providing insights on how organizations and their members have agency in
affecting media attributions about business events.
Taken together, the two essays investigate the media’s attributional processes
behind the development of individual or organizational celebrity. Specifically, I provide
5

theoretical arguments to suggest that individual and organizational celebrity emerge as
journalists develop causal attributions about business events, and imprint those
attributions in the narrative frames adopted in their reporting. Overall, therefore, the
development of individual or organizational celebrity can be characterized as a ‘framing
contest’ affected not only by the media understanding and interpretation of specific
events, but also by the agency of organizations and their members, in promoting specific
interpretative frames.

6

1. CHAPTER I A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF BUSINESS CELEBRITY:
COMBINING AGENDA SETTING AND FRAMING THEORY

7

Abstract
CEOs and entrepreneurs or entire organizations often become celebrities known
and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries.
Previous research has investigated antecedents and consequences of individual- and
organizational-celebrity, specifically focusing on the role played by the media as the
central information intermediary for the development of these social approval assets.
Nevertheless, research on individual and organizational celebrity has proceeded largely
independently, hampering our understanding of business celebrity in multiple ways. I
address the limitations of the current literature and develop a multi-level theory of
business celebrity, focusing on the relative availability of attributional frames that foster
the development of celebrity at different levels. I contribute to celebrity theory in three
main ways. First, I identify the factors that influence its development at one level rather
than the other, or why and how it can emerge at both the individual and organizational
levels. Second, I theorize how individual and organizational celebrity co-evolve over
time. Third, I discuss performance implications of business celebrity when it
concomitantly occurs at the individual and organizational levels.

Introduction
Celebrity is a pervasive phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova
et al., 2006) and, transcending its original boundaries, has become a relevant factor in the
business context. Often CEOs and entrepreneurs (e.g. Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Welch)
or entire organizations (e.g. Apple and Tesla) are in the spotlight and become celebrities
known and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries.
8

Given its pervasiveness, celebrity has attracted attention across multiple disciplines,
ranging from marketing (McCracken, 1989; Rein et al., 1987) to sociology (Ferris, 2007;
Rojek, 2004; Van de Rijt, Shor, Ward, & Skiena, 2013), communication (Austin, Vord,
Pinkleton, & Epstein, 2008; Gamson, 1992; Slater, 2002), and organizational studies
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Such an interdisciplinary approach to the
construct has generated a diverse and multifaceted representation of what celebrity is, and
its antecedents and consequences.
Within the context of organizational studies, celebrities are defined as social
actors that attract a high levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses
from their audiences, often through the mediating role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock,
2016; Rindova et al., 2006). Similarly to other social approval assets such as status,
reputation, and legitimacy, celebrity is important because constituents’ perceptions of
organizations and their leaders have critical implications for strategy formulation,
strategy implementation and organizational outcomes (Rindova et al., 2006). In general,
previous research has investigated antecedents and consequences of individual (see
Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen et al., 2008; Ranft et al.,
2007; Wade et al., 2006, 2008) and organizational celebrity, (see Kjærgaard et al., 2011;
Perryman, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006), specifically focusing on the
role played by the media as the central information intermediary for the development of
these social approval assets. Emerging from these studies is an initial understanding of
how individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and an appreciation of their
distinctive effects on individual and organizational outcomes.
9

Nevertheless, research on individual and organizational celebrity has largely
proceeded on separate, isolated tracks, despite suggestions that the two are
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006) with only few exceptions (see Perryman, 2008).
These parallel yet insulated research streams have affected our understanding of celebrity
in organizations in three main ways. First, we lack an understanding of the factors that
influence the development of celebrity at one level rather than the other, or why and how
it can emerge at both the individual and organizational levels. This distinction is
important since research has shown that individual and organizational celebrity have
different effects on organizational outcomes (see Graffin et al., 2012b; Pfarrer et al.,
2010; Wade et al., 2006). Second, by investigating individual and organizational celebrity
independently, current theory on celebrity limits our understanding of how they coevolve over time. Often, celebrity individuals such as CEOs or entrepreneurs are involved
in an organization’s celebrity development process (Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa.
Yet, research thus far has not addressed this issue and, adopting a fairly static approach to
the study of this phenomenon, disregards how multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over
time. This is problematic as individual and organizational celebrity are interdependent
(Rindova et al., 2006) ant theorized to be relatively unstable when compared to other
important social approval assets such as reputation, status or legitimacy. Lastly, by
investigating individual and organizational celebrity independently, current theory on
celebrity does not provide an understanding of the performance implications of these two
constructs when occurring together. Indeed, previous literature has only investigated the
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performance implications of individual and organizational celebrity separately (Pfarrer et
al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006).
I address these opportunities to unite this literature and develop a multi-level
model of business celebrity, building on the central role played by the media in
disseminating the type of narratives needed to cast a social actor as a celebrity (Hayward
et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). First, I investigate why and how the media choose to
frame their narratives at the individual and/or the organizational level, developing the
dramatized realities that foster the emergence of individual and/or organizational
celebrity, respectively. In doing so, I take a constructivist approach (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1994) and, building on framing theory (Entman, 1993), suggest that media
discourse about business events entails interpretative packages at the core of which are
not only attributional frames (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006) but also other
cognitive and affective frames. I theorize that when business events occur that are
newsworthy, the adoption of individual or organizational attributional frames in media
narratives, in combination with positive affective frames, will foster the development of
individual or organizational celebrity. I then identify factors that affect this adoption
process and theorize that the choice of attributional frame is affected by their resonance
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013).
Second, I theorize about the possible co-evolution dynamics of celebrity across
organizational levels. In doing so, I theorize about two possible evolution patterns:
cooperative and competitive celebrity dynamics. Cooperative dynamics occur when there
is a shift from either individual or organizational celebrity towards a combination of the
11

two. Competitive dynamics occur when there is a shift from a combination of individual
and organizational celebrity towards only one of the two. Further, I identify factors that
can foster the development of cooperative celebrity dynamics. Specifically, the choice of
frames in media narratives is influenced by changes in: the types of other cognitive
frames adopted in media narratives, an individual’s identification processes with the
organization, and the organizational culture.
Finally, I discuss specific performance advantages and disadvantages that may
arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared to the possession of
either one. I do not develop formal propositions about such performance implications
given that the theoretical focus is on the development and co-evolution processes of these
two distinctive, yet highly interrelated, social approval assets. Nevertheless, I discuss
such implications as they are important in providing a picture of the complex ways in
which different social approval assets contribute to organizational performance.
In developing the theory, I provide multiple contributions. First, I contribute to
celebrity theory by developing a multi-level model of business celebrity that bridges
research on the construct at the individual and organizational levels. The constructs of
individual and organizational celebrity have been treated independently in most studies.
Nevertheless, they are interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006) and may have synergistic or
competitive effects on organizational outcomes. Therefore, treating individual and
organizational celebrity autonomously does not provide the most accurate picture of how
media coverage of organizations and their members comes about and how it develops
over time. This model offers understanding of the circumstances under which the media
12

adopt an organizational- or an individual-level frame, leading to the development of
different types of celebrity. Second, by investigating how these different forms of media
narratives may co-evolve over time, I contribute to celebrity theory by pinpointing
celebrity dynamics that affect the sustainability of these social approval assets over time.
Also, I identify appropriability issues by isolating situations under which the individual
and the organization may ‘compete’ (instead of cooperate) to attain or maintain celebrity.
Lastly, by discussing performance implications of individual and organizational celebrity,
I contribute to the strategic management literature by delineating the relationship between
a combination of social approval assets and organizational competitive advantage.

Business Celebrity
The word ‘celebrity’ derives from the Latin word ‘celebritatem’ meaning
condition of being famous or renowned. Four defining characteristics seem to delineate
the definition of celebrity within organizational studies: celebrities are i) social actors,
that attract high levels of ii) public attention, and elicit iii) positive emotional responses
from the public, due to their positive valence for the audience, iv) through the mediating
role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006).
In organizational studies on celebrity, both individuals and organizations have been
studied as ‘social actors’ that can attain this social approval asset. I briefly review the
literature on individual and organizational celebrity before theorizing about why and how
either level of celebrity is likely to emerge, how they co-evolve over time and with what
performance implications.

13

Individual Celebrity
At the individual level, celebrity is theorized to emerge as the media attribute a
firm’s actions and positive performance to its leader (typically the CEO or founder),
rather than to organizational and environmental constraints, or luck (Hayward et al.,
2004). Specifically, individual celebrity emerges as the media develop and promote
individual-level attributions about non-conforming organizational actions (Hayward et
al., 2004) – as media attention is affected by the saliency of those actions (Fiske &
Taylor, 2013). Also, the likelihood of such attributions is increased when the individual is
associated with similar actions across different contexts and circumstances (Hayward et
al., 2004), and when information about his/her idiosyncratic behaviors are highly
available (Hayward et al., 2004).
From an empirical stand-point, both antecedents and consequences of individual
celebrity have been investigated. On the one hand, researchers investigating the
antecedents of individual celebrity found that the media tend to overstate individuals’
contributions to firm performance, as leadership is often construed as a central
organizational process representing the main explanatory factor to comprehend
organizational actions and performance (Chen & Meindl, 1991; Meindl, Ehrlich, &
Dukerich, 1985). Due to motivational (Staw & Sutton, 1992) and cognitive factors
(Hayward et al., 2004; Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977), as well as information-processing
constraints and work demands typical of the journalistic profession (Gitlin, 1980;
Hayward et al., 2004; Tuchman, 1978), journalists tend to interpret important, yet
causally ambiguous business events, using leadership explanations (Hayward et al., 2004;
14

Meindl et al., 1985). On the other hand, researchers investigating the consequences of
individual celebrity found that it is positively related to compensation contingent on
positive organizational performance (Wade et al., 2006). When subsequent organizational
performance is poor, individual celebrity will negatively affect compensation (Wade et
al., 2006). As such, compensation of celebrity CEOs, for example, is more tightly
coupled with organizational performance, than compensation of non-celebrity CEOs
(Wade et al., 2006). These findings seem to be in line with the idea that celebrity, as well
as other social approval assets foster higher expectations for the future and, therefore, can
bring both benefits and burdens (Graffin et al., 2012b; Zavyalova et al., 2016b).
Similar results can be found when looking at the effects of individual celebrity on
organizational-level outcomes. Celebrity leaders can facilitate value creation for their
organizations by way of their stardom increasing credibility among stakeholders and
fostering the perception of high quality and greater potential (Wade et al., 2006).
However, favorable media attributions can also foster an individual’s self-esteem and
perception of importance, facilitating the development of hubris and consequent biased
decision making processes (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sinha, Inkson, & Barker,
2012). Also, celebrity leaders may be penalized by the fact that they generate higher
expectations among stakeholders, and those expectations are more likely to be
disappointed (Graffin et al., 2012b). Empirical evidences demonstrate that the positive
effect of CEO celebrity on organizational performance is short lived, and in the long-term
CEO celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006).
Moreover, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across firms (e.g. CEO succession)
15

and, consequently, it cannot be considered a stable resource for the organization (Graffin
et al., 2012b).
Organizational Celebrity
At the organizational level, celebrity emerges as the media create “dramatized
realities” attributing extraordinary qualities to organizations while reporting about
industry or societal changes (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). Specifically, firms undertaking
distinctive actions and displaying distinctive identities are theorized to more likely be the
center of media attention, as journalists will use them as “vivid examples of important
changes in industries and society in general” (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). By focusing
attention on these organizations, the media emotionally engage audiences through the
creation of a dramatized reality. Once again, the emergence of organizational celebrity is
fostered by the availability of idiosyncratic information about the organization, in such a
way that the more the organization or the CEO provides the media with information
about organizational activities, culture, and identity, the more likely organizational
celebrity will emerge (Rindova et al., 2006).
Once developed, organizational celebrity has multiple effects on organizational
decision making and change processes. First, intense positive media coverage has both a
sense-making and self-enhancement effect on organizational members (Kjærgaard et al.,
2011), consequently affecting organizational processes and outcomes. For example,
research shows that over time organizational celebrity may impede identity work by
organizational members as the positive media coverage is too appealing for
organizational members, even when it contrasts with the reality they experience within
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the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). To a certain extent, “as the media publicizes
information about an organization, public impressions of the organization and of the
organization’s members become part of the currency through which member’s selfconcepts and identifications are built or are eroded” (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail,
1994: 241). Therefore, as much as positive media attention to CEOs can lead them to
‘believe their own press’ (Hayward et al., 2004), similarly, positive media attention to the
organization seems to affect members perceptions of the organizational identity above
and beyond what they experience directly.
Second, firms that have achieved celebrity are more likely to announce positive
earnings surprises than firms without this asset (Pfarrer et al., 2010), as celebrity is
developed through engaging in non-conforming actions with “harder-to-predict
outcomes” (Pfarrer et al., 2010: 1134). Also, celebrity firms tend to receive greater
market rewards when announcing positive earnings surprises as shareholders expect
greater unpredictability while maintaining a positive affective frame (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
In addition, celebrity firms receive smaller market penalties when announcing negative
earnings surprises as a positive affective frame may foster the likelihood that
shareholders may disregard discrepant information (Pfarrer et al., 2010). However, theory
on organizational celebrity suggests that this social approval asset may be short-lived
when compared to other organizational social evaluations (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger,
2016a). Nevertheless, since unlike individual celebrity organizational celebrity is tied to
the organization as a whole, it is less mobile across organizations than CEO celebrity and,
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consequently, can be considered a more stable resource for the organization (Graffin et
al., 2012b).
To summarize, once developed, individual and organizational celebrity seem to
have different consequences for organizational performance. In the long term, CEO
celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006) as it
generates higher stakeholder expectations while also fostering hubris and consequently
biased decision making processes. Conversely, organizational celebrity seems to increase
organizational performance as it fosters the adoption by stakeholders of a positive affect
frame towards the organization. Also, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across
organizations, while it is not at the organizational level. Consequently, organizational
celebrity has a greater potential to constitute a strategic resource for the organization
(Barney, 1991). For these reasons, there is great value in investigating these two
constructs concomitantly to understand how celebrity develops at different levels and
how it evolves across them.
Business Celebrity as a Framing Contest
As shown in the discussion of the previous literature, there is general consensus
that celebrities are well known social actors whose existence is inextricably related to the
media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al., 2004; Rojek, 2004). In modern society, celebrity
(at both the individual and organizational level) is a product of mass communication
(Boorstin, 1961; Gamson, 1992; Rein et al., 1987; Rindova et al., 2006), and is closely
related to media coverage (Van de Rijt et al., 2013).
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As social institutions directed toward the production of knowledge and culture
(McQuail, 1985: 97), the media are very relevant in determining the way in which
stakeholders and the general public make sense of organizations (Hayward et al., 2004;
McCombs, 2005; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shaw & McCombs, 1977) and reality in
general. Indeed, “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct
meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989: 2). Given causal ambiguities around the
determinants of business events, the media become important agents in the construction
of perceptions about organizational life, by adopting and disseminating specific
interpretations (Wade et al., 2006). Considering the importance of the media agendasetting process in determining celebrity, I set out to understand how media agenda is built
in the context of business celebrity, and apply framing theory (Entman, 1993; Entman,
Matthes, & Pellicano, 2009) to understand how specific narrative frames are selected and
promoted within media coverage of business news to generate celebrity.
Journalists make sense of business events by developing narratives about them.
Such narratives are “thematic sequenced accounts that convey meaning” (Barry & Elmes,
1997: 431) and specific interpretations of reality to their audiences, through a framing
activity (Entman, 1993). Multiple journalistic frames – i.e. a schema or heuristic, a
knowledge structure that is activated by some stimulus and is then employed by a
journalist through story construction (Entman et al., 2009) – are usually embedded in
these narratives (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983). Typically, a narrative text describes a
progression of events (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983) and entails several deep-level features
(Pentland, 1999) that can be categorized as cognitive or affective frames (McCombs,
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Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 1997). First, cognitive frames regard the substantive
attributes used to describe and portray a specific object in the media – e.g. narrative
sequence of events, causal explanations/attributions, focal actors, and so on. Second,
affective frames regard the affective attributes used to describe and portray a specific
object in the media – e.g. positive, negative and neutral descriptions (McCombs et al.,
1997).
Drawing from these two categories, I focus on three specific frames: i) narrative
sequence of events, ii) attributional, and iii) affective frames. First, a narrative sequence
of events is a typical feature of a text (Barthes, 1988; Bruner, 1990). Once a business
event occurs that is selected by the media for coverage, journalists frame it by selecting
how to present the sequence of events in their narratives. It is important to note that,
following this process, an ‘objective’ business event can originate very different media
narratives. For example, after the launch of a new product, media reporting about this
event may adopt a sequence of events frame from across any of these levels: the
organizational-level with a story on how the product is the expression of a new strategic
direction and how it will foster organizational performance, the industry-level with a
story on how the product will bring change in the industry, or the societal-level with a
story on how the product will bring change in society.
Second, attributional frames are also embedded in media narratives about
business events (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In general, several social
actors can serve as focal actors for attribution in media narratives about business events,
as stories can be about individual, groups or whole organizations (Pentland, 1999), and
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causal attributions can be made at these different levels. The inherent ambiguity and
complexity of business events creates the possibility of contestable attributional frames –
i.e. situations where attributional frames are open to interpretation as multiple frames are
available (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and multiple social actors can serve as focal actors
for media narratives about these events. Specifically, two of modern society’s main
journalistic frames used to explain business events are: leadership and organizational
factors (Schein, 1985). Table 1.11 reports extracts of Bloomberg BusinessWeek articles to
exemplify how similar business events can be reported using different narrative sequence
of events and attributional frames.
Third, an affective frame regards the affective attributes used within a media
narrative (McCombs et al., 1997). The media convey not only facts but also feeling and
tone that serve to shape the public interpretation of those facts (McCombs, 1992;
Patterson, 1993). Following the definition of celebrity as social actors that attract high
levels of public attention that is also positively emotionally charged, I am specifically
interested in positive affective frames and their combination with cognitive frames for the
development of individual and organizational celebrity.
Overall, how the media select and combine these frames is important in
determining the development of the different dramatized realities about business events
which, in turn, lead to individual and/or organizational celebrity. Specifically, celebrity
emerges for the focal actor to which the media attributes the sequence of events in the
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Tables and Figures are reported in Appendix 1 at the end of Chapter 1.
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narration (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006), when the affective frames used are
positive. Therefore, to understand how celebrity emerges at different organizational
levels, we need to understand how social actors are selected as the ‘focal actor’ in the
attributional frame.
There are three possible outcomes of this framing contest in the development of
media narratives: individual, organizational or convergent celebrity (see Figure 1.1).
Individual celebrity emerges when media narratives are centered on an individual
as the focal actor of the attributional frame in the story. Therefore, individual celebrity
emerges when media narratives are dominated by individual-level attributional frames to
explain business events. Rather than viewing the individual and the organization as
complementary elements of the narrative, the media tend to perceive the individual as
central to the story, to such an extent that the attention focuses mostly at the individual
level and the organization may become peripheral to the story. For example, the media
may tend to explain a firm’s actions and success by the behaviors and characteristics of a
specific individual within the organization (Hayward et al., 2004) – usually the CEO or
the entrepreneur/founder.
Organizational celebrity emerges when media narratives are centered on the
organization as the focal actor of the attributional frame in the story. Rather than viewing
the individual and the organization as complementary elements of the narrative, in this
case, the media perceives the organization as central to the story, and actions of
individuals are either missing from the story or given supporting roles. Consequently,
most attention is placed on the organization as a whole, rather than on any individual
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within it. For example, the media may explain industry or business events by identifying
specific firms within the industry that can serve the need for causal attribution and be
identified as the agents of change (Rindova et al., 2006).
Convergent celebrity emerges when media narratives are dominated by both
individual- and organizational-level attributional frames. In these situations, the
organization and the individual are viewed as complementary elements, each one plying
significant and relevant roles in the story. Therefore, in convergent celebrity significant
attention is placed at both levels. For example:
“The office building on Facebook Way is in the unfinished style that honors
materials like plywood, concrete, and steel. The I-beams supporting its soaring walls still
have the builders’ chalk placement instructions on them. It takes a business making
billions of high-margin dollars to make plywood and concrete seem so appealing. The
merely ordinary have to put up drywall. […] Then, at the center, standing at his desk
announcing something to a colleague, there’s Zuckerberg. He’s a great stander; he has
terrific posture. […] If you spray-painted Zuckerberg a high-gloss white and told him to
gaze off into the distance, he’d look exactly like a 1st century A.D. bust of Tiberius at the
Capitoline Museum in Rome. Zuckerberg would get the reference. A scholar of the
classics, he named his daughter Maxima, after the Roman, not the Nissan […].
Zuckerberg doesn’t wear a toga, unfortunately, but like any icon, he has a signature
look—gray T-shirt, jeans, and sneakers.” (Urstadt & Frier, 2016).
As highlighted in this example, both the individual and the organization are main
characters in the story and each social actor is instrumental to the creation of a
dramatized reality.
In the next section of the paper, I focus on understanding the factors affecting the
adoption of individual or organizational attributional frames, which in turn foster the
emergence of individual, organizational or convergent celebrity. Specifically, I focus on
the relative availability of these attributional frames and investigate factors that affect
their resonance and lead to the development of celebrity at different levels.
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Frame Adoption
Frames are interpretative schemas used for both comprehending and presenting
reality (Scheufele, 1999). Research on framing can be found in social and cognitive
science, as well as in the political science and the communication fields. As a result of
such widespread use across multiple disciplines, multiple definitions have been adopted
in the literature. When focusing on their role in communication, researchers have referred
to ‘frames’ as “the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker uses
when relaying information to another, or what can be called frames in communication”
(Druckman, 2001: 227).
Framing should be interpreted as a diachronic process where, in their choice of
journalistic frames, journalists are bounded by the cultural stock of schemas commonly
found in a society which records the traces of past framing (Entman et al., 2009). When
business events occur that are newsworthy, commentaries about them draw on culturally
available ideas and symbols that are organized and clustered into causal frames.
Not all frames are equally potent. Certain frames have a natural advantage
because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1994). In general, resonance increases the appeal of a frame as it makes a
frame appear natural and familiar. Specifically, resonance not only increases the
likelihood of the frame’s adoption by journalists, but also increases its effect on the
audience, as journalists and their audience are in the same culture (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1994).
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Three factors that affect the resonance of individual, organizational or convergent
attributional frames and thereby influence the emergence of celebrity: i) organizational
cultural repertoire, ii) an individual’s identification processes with an organization, and
iii) the media’s choice of other cognitive frames. Specifically, the first two are important
as they affect the content of communication materials available to the media for
developing their news reports. I proceed by delineating how these actors affect the
development of celebrity at different organizational levels.
Organizational Communication
Previous studies on celebrity have identified the important role played by
organizational communication materials in building the media agenda (Blyskal &
Blyskal, 1985; Rindova et al., 2006). Public relations activities are considered very
important in influencing the media agenda, and research has shown that they can have a
great influence on media content (Cameron, Sallot, & Curtin, 1997; Kiousis, Mitrook,
Wu, & Seltzer, 2006; Lee & Solomon, 1990; Sallot & Johnson, 2006). Using press
conferences, news releases, interviews and other communication tools, public relations
professionals provide information subsidies to journalists to affect the construction of the
media agenda (Kiousis et al., 2006). By providing these information subsidies, public
relations practitioners reduce the time needed by journalists to report about a specific
event, and the press often uses the least costly and most readily available sources of
information (Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001). In the context of IPOs, Pollock and
colleagues found a strong correlation of .42 between the volume of press releases and the
volume of media coverage (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Also, studying corporate
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takeovers, Ohl and colleagues found that organizational press releases influence the
media agenda not only in terms of frequency of coverage but also in terms of the specific
interpretations conveyed (Ohl, Pincus, Rimmer, & Harrison, 1995). It follows that
organizations and their members can not only influence what topics are covered in the
media, but also how they are framed in the media agenda. “In developing programs,
public relations professionals fundamentally operate as frame strategists, who strive to
determine how situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues and responsibility should be
posed to achieve favorable objectives” (Hallahan, 1999: 224). Overall, journalists tend to
make large use of wire agencies and editors are reluctant to significantly change wire
content (Atwater, Fico, & Pizante, 1987).
In summary, organizations and their members can exert their agency in the
development of media narratives about organizational life, by providing idiosyncratic
information about the CEO persona, organizational actions, and organizational culture. In
doing so, they provide the media with the information needed for the development of the
dramatized realities that are the core of the development of individual, organizational or
convergent celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Indeed, by framing
organizational communication materials at specific levels, managers and communication
professionals can increase the resonance and accessibility (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) of
those frames in the mind of journalists, affecting the production of media narratives.
However, previous literature has not directly investigated why organizational
communication materials may be focused at the individual or organizational level.
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I suggest that an individual’s organizational identification processes with the
organization and organizational cultural repertoire are two important factors affecting the
frames adopted in organizational communication materials, and therefore affect the
development of individual, organizational or convergent celebrity. I theorize about these
factors in the remaining of this section.
Individual Identification with the Organization. Social identity theory suggests
that individuals define themselves partly on the basis of their affiliation with different
social groups (e.g. their organization, their profession, their family, etc.), and that not all
of these affiliations contribute equally to one’s definition of oneself (Ashforth & Mael,
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Organizational identification refers to a “cognitive linking
between the definition of the organization and the definition of self” (Dutton et al., 1994:
242). Strong organizational identification indicates that the individual considers the
organizational identity – i.e. what an organization’s members perceive as the central,
distinctive and enduring values and goals of the organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985) –
worthy and integrates it into his/her own sense of self. For organizational identification to
arise, the individual must perceive the organizational identity as salient and he/she must
self-categorize in terms of his/her membership in the organization (Pratt, 1998). It
follows that different organizational members may differ in their level of reliance on the
organization as an identity-defining social group.
In general, therefore, organizational identification refers to “perception of oneness
with” an organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21; Galvin, Lange, & Ashforth, 2015).
Theory on organizational identification has identified multiple types of identifications
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based on the level of convergence of the individual and organizational identity (Galvin et
al., 2015). First, conventional identification implies both internalization – i.e.
incorporating aspects of an organization’s identity into one’s sense of self – and
externalization – i.e. incorporating aspects of oneself into one’s perception of the
organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015). Strong conventional organizational
identification occurs when the organizational member’s own identity and his/her
perception of the organization’s identity overlay completely so that the organization is
central to the individual’s definition of self (Galvin et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the
individual maintains a sense of self independent from the organization so that the
individual identity is not subsumed by the organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015).
Second, over-identification occurs when extreme internalization is not
compensated by externalization. In these situations, the individual’s identity is lost within
his/her perception of the organization’s identity (Dukerich, Kramer, & Parks, 1998). The
organizational member sees him/herself as an expression of the organization’s identity,
instead of using it as a reference point to help define his/her individual identity (Galvin et
al., 2015).
Third, narcissistic organizational identification occurs when extreme levels of
externalization are not compensated by internalization (Galvin et al., 2015). In these
situations, the individual identity dominates, and the organizational member perceives the
organization as an expression of him/herself. The individual conceives the organization in
terms of self and his/her own identity becomes the fundamental point of reference for
understanding the organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015).
28

How an individual identifies with his/her organization affects his/her provision of
information to external stakeholders and to the media in particular (Chatterjee & Pollock,
2016). When the individual has strong influence on organizational decision making
process, communication activities and overall strategic processes (as in the case of a CEO
or founder), his/her identification processes is likely to strongly affect the type of
information provided and used by the media. Specifically, I theorize that individuals with
strong levels of narcissistic organizational identification, will more likely provide the
media with idiosyncratic information about themselves (Rindova et al., 2006), and
engage in ingratiatory (Westphal & Deephouse, 2011) and symbolic (Bednar, 2012)
behaviors towards journalists (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016). This will foster the
development of media narratives framed at the individual level. On the other hand, I
theorize that individuals that strongly over-identify with the organization will more likely
provide the media with information about the organization as a whole, rather than about
themselves, fostering the development of media narratives framed at the organizational
level. Lastly, individuals that have strong conventional organizational identification will
more likely provide the media with information about themselves and the organization,
fostering the development of media narratives framed at both the individual and
organizational levels.
To summarize, different types of identification with one’s organization will foster
the adoption of different attributional frames in the communication materials to the
media, affecting the resonance of such frames, and consequently the likelihood of their
adoption. Ultimately, by providing information framed at different levels, individuals
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within organizations can affect the adoption of a specific frame-level in media narratives.
Stated formally:
Proposition 1: The likelihood of adoption of individual/organizational level
frames in media coverage of business events is related to an individual’s identification
processes with the organization.
a) Narcissistic organizational identification increases the likelihood of adoption of
individual-level frames.
b) Over-identification with the organization increases the likelihood of adoption of
organizational-level frames.
c) Conventional organizational identification increases the likelihood of adoption of
convergent frames.
Organizational Cultural Repertoire. Organizational culture has been defined as a
system of collectively accepted and interconnected taken-for-granted beliefs and values
that are manifested in idiosyncratic patterns of thought, speech, and behavior in a given
organizational environment at a given time (Barley, 1983; Canato, Ravasi, & Phillips,
2013; Martin, 2002; Pettigrew, 1979). In his original work on culture, Schein (1985)
conceptualized it as existing simultaneously on three levels: basic assumptions – i.e.
taken-for-granted beliefs – values – i.e. social principles, aims and norms considered to
have intrinsic worth – and artifacts – i.e. the tangible outcomes of activities grounded in
values and assumptions (Hatch, 1993). Early research focused on the deep level of
assumptions that unknowingly shape action and, therefore, culture was conceived as a
constraint (Canato et al., 2013). Recent research has focused on culture as a toolkit
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(Swidler, 1986) of resources that are employed to attain different goals (Rindova,
Dalpiaz, & Ravasi, 2011). These toolkits of cultural resources include things such as
symbols, language, stories, narratives, rituals and myths (Rindova et al., 2011; Swidler,
1986) that together form an organizational cultural repertoire – i.e. those resources that an
organization has selected from the broader industry and societal cultural toolkits
(Rindova et al., 2011).
Organizational cultural resources such as narratives, rituals, and myths, express
and reinforce what is valued within an organization (Pettigrew, 1979). First, I theorize
that when specific individuals are at the center of the cultural resources forming an
organizational repertoire, organizational communication materials will more likely be
focused at the individual level, fostering the adoption of individual-level frames in media
coverage of business events about that organization. For example, the more the CEO is at
the center of organizational rituals, myths and narratives, the more organizational
communication materials to the media will also be focused at the individual level
fostering the adoption of individual-level frames in media narratives about business
events regarding the organization. Second, I theorize that when the organization as a
whole is at the center of the resources forming its cultural repertoire, organizational
communication materials will more likely be focused at the organizational level, fostering
the adoption of organizational-level frames in media coverage of business events about
the organization. Lastly, I theorize that when an organization’s cultural repertoire
encompasses both individual- and organizational-level narratives, myths, and rituals,
organizational communication materials will be balanced in presenting both individual31

and organizational-level frames, fostering the adoption of convergent frames in media
coverage of business events about the organization. Stated formally:
Proposition 2: The likelihood of adoption of individual, organizational or
convergent frames in media coverage business events is related to an organization’s
cultural repertoire.
a) An organizational cultural repertoire strongly focused on specific individuals
within an organization increases the likelihood of adoption of individual-level frames.
b) An organizational cultural repertoire strongly focused on the organization as a
whole increases the likelihood of adoption of organizational-level frames.
c) An organizational cultural repertoire that balances attention to individuals within
an organization and the organization as a whole increases the likelihood of adoption of
convergent frames.
Frame Packages
As previously discussed, media play a central role in determining the emergence
of different types of celebrity by developing dramatized narratives about business events
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). They do this by selecting cognitive and
affective frames and combining them into narratives which dramatize realities about
business events. Causal explanations are often embedded in these narratives, to render
these events “coherent and comprehensible” for the audiences (Rindova et al., 2006: 56).
In developing such causal attributions, journalists propose a certain interpretation of
reality, and cast individuals or organizations as celebrities by putting them at the center of
their narratives (i.e. by selecting them as focal actor/s in the narrative text).
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When inferring causal explanations, properties of a cause are generally assumed
to be comparable to analogous properties of the effect (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shultz &
Ravinsky, 1977), since a certain degree of comparability between effect and cause is
expected. This ‘similarity principle’ has been applied to a number of different properties
– e.g. the assumption that a good behavior effect must have been caused by a good person
(Kelley, 1973) – but relevant to my theory development is its application to intensity as a
relevant property in determining causal attributions. When inferring causal attributions,
the intensity of the effect is assumed to vary proportionately with the intensity of its
cause (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shultz & Ravinsky, 1977). Thus, the rule of similarity
suggests that the intensity of an event affects the types of causal attributions made by
observers, in that an event will be more likely attributed to a cause that is perceived to
have an adequate (i.e. similar) intensity. Consequently, a more complex set of media
stories will increase the resonance and consequently the adoption of a more complex set
of focal actor/s to explain those events.
Following this reasoning, I theorize that individual attributional frames (i.e. an
individual as the focal actor in the narrative text) will be more likely combined with an
organizational-level sequence of events frame. Leadership is widely construed as a causal
explanation for organizational actions and outcomes (Meindl et al., 1985) and over time
the concept of leadership has become firmly rooted in the collective understanding of
organizational life (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). This romance of leadership “can be
construed as an assumption, preconception, or bias that interested observers and
participants bring to bear when they must find an intellectually compelling and
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emotionally satisfying comprehension of the causes, nature, and consequences of
organizational activities” (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987: 92). Thus, individual attributions are
likely to resonate more when journalists write organizational-level stories, as they will be
deemed more intensity-appropriate.
Also, I theorize that organizational attributional frames (i.e. an organization as the
focal actor in the narrative text) will be more likely combined with an industry-level
sequence of events frame. When writing stories about industry changes, the media are
more inclined to adopt organizational attributions as such explanations are deemed more
intensity-appropriate, and therefore will become more resonant. Given the nature of the
story, specific expectations and suppositions about the cause will emerge. I expect that
journalists’ causal schemata will foster the choice of more intense and complex sets of
causes when writing stories about industry-level change events. For example, research
shows that individual success on simple tasks can be explained in terms of ability or
effort (Kelley & Michela, 1980). On the other hand, individual success on complex tasks
requires the use of both criteria (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Given their complexity, stories
framed as industry-level sequence of events will require the use of more complex
explanatory systems, above and beyond leadership. In these situations, organizational
attributions represent a valid alternative to leadership explanations, as they represent a
more complex system of interrelated causes, and may be deemed more intensityappropriate.
Following similar logic, I theorize that both individual and organizational
attributional frames are used in stories framed as societal-level sequence of events, as the
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complexity of these stories calls for even more complex systems of causes than either
individual- or organizational-level attributions can provide. Consequently, when
journalists write narratives framed as societal-level events, convergent attributions
(individual and organizational) will become more resonant as they represent a more
complex system of interrelated causes, and may be deemed more intensity-appropriate.
Stated formally:
Proposition 3: The likelihood of adoption of individual, organizational or
convergent attributional frames in media coverage of business events is related to the
complexity of the story being narrated.
a) Individual-level frames are more likely adopted in stories on organizational
change.
b) Organizational-level frames are more likely adopted in stories on industry
change.
c) Convergent frames are more likely adopted in stories on societal change.

Frames Evolution
Individual and organizational celebrity are highly interdependent and oftentimes,
celebrity individuals such as CEOs or entrepreneurs may be involved in an organization’s
celebrity development process (Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa. Yet, research thus
far has not addressed this issue and, adopting a mostly static approach to the study of this
phenomenon, disregards how multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over time.
Addressing this issue, I now focus on understanding how and why frames in media
narratives may change over time fostering a shift across the three forms of media
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coverage represented in Figure 1.1 (i.e. individual, organizational, and convergent
celebrity).
Since the choice of frames in media narratives is not static, I theorize that changes
in the factors previously identified as affecting the resonance of individual and
organizational frames, may foster two evolution patterns can occur: cooperative
dynamics and competitive dynamics. Cooperative dynamics occur when from individual
or organizational celebrity there is a shift towards convergent celebrity. In these
situations, individual and organizational frames support each other in the development of
both social approval assets. Competitive dynamics occur when, from convergent
celebrity, there is a shift towards individual or organizational celebrity. In these
situations, the frames seem to compete, rather than cooperate in the
development/maintenance of both social approval assets.
First, in the previous section, I suggested that how an individual identifies with
his/her organization affects his/her provision of information to external stakeholders and
to the media in particular (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016), fostering the adoption of different
attributional frames. Nevertheless, identification processes may change over time. First,
such changes are likely to occur following turnover events. Nevertheless, they can also
occur following events that trigger an individual’s need to preserve or enhance his/her
perception of their social identity. Social identity theory suggests that individuals use
cognitive tactics such as selective self-categorization (Turner, 1987) to preserve or
enhance positive perceptions of their social identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Hogg &
Abrams, 1988). I expect that following, turnover, identity-threatening (Elsbach &
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Kramer, 1996) or identity-enhancing events, individuals’ organizational identifications
may change over time. This will affect the provision of information to external
stakeholders, and thus foster shifts across different types of celebrity.
Specifically, I theorize that changes in such identification processes will foster the
development of different types of celebrity dynamics. When individuals’ identification
process shifts from either strong narcissistic identification or strong over-identification
towards strong conventional identification, this will affect his/her provision of
information to the media, and increase the likelihood of celebrity cooperative dynamics,
facilitating a shift from individual or organizational celebrity towards convergent
celebrity. On the other hand, when the individual identification process shifts from either
strong conventional identification towards strong narcissistic or over-identification, this
will affect his/her provision of information to the media, and increase the likelihood of
celebrity competitive dynamics, facilitating a shift from convergent celebrity towards
individual or organizational celebrity.
Proposition 4: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in the
individual’s identification processes with the organization:
a) A change from either strong narcissistic or strong over-identification processes to
strong conventional identification will increase the likelihood of cooperative dynamics to
develop over time.
b) A change from strong conventional identification to either strong narcissistic or
strong over-identification processes will increase the likelihood of competitive dynamics
to develop over time.
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Second, in the previous section, I identified organizational cultural repertoire as
an important factor in the adoption of different attributional frames. Specifically, I
theorized that cultural resources within an organization such as stories, symbols, rituals
and myths will affect the content of the communication materials to the media and thus
affect the development of celebrity. An organizational cultural repertoire, however, may
change over time as it is affected by an organization’s external environment (Rindova et
al., 2011). Consequently, changes in an industry’s cultural registry (Weber, 2005) foster
changes in the cultural resources of an organization. Following these dynamics, I expect
that changes in organizational cultural repertoires will foster shifts across different types
of celebrity. Specifically, I theorize that when an organizational cultural repertoire shifts
from one that is strongly focused on either specific individuals or the organization as a
whole to a more balanced one, this will affect organizational communication materials,
and will increase the likelihood of the media to engage in cooperative dynamics fostering
the development of convergent celebrity. On the other hand, when an organizational
cultural repertoire shifts from one that is balanced towards one that is strongly focused on
either specific individuals or the organization as a whole, this will affect organizational
communication materials, and increase the likelihood of the media to engage in
competitive dynamics fostering the development of convergent celebrity. Stated formally:
Proposition 5: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in an
organization’s cultural repertoire:
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a) A change in an organization’s cultural repertoire from either strong individual
focus or strong organizational focus towards a balanced focus will increase the
likelihood of cooperative dynamics to develop over time.
b) A change in an organization’s cultural repertoire from a balanced focus to either
strong individual focus or strong organizational focus will increase the likelihood of
competitive dynamics to develop over time.
Third, in the previous section, I suggested that the adoption of attributional frame
is affected by the other frames adopted by journalists within the same stories.
Specifically, I focused on how the choice regarding the level of sequence of events
affects the choice of attributional frames, following the rule of similarity criteria.
Nevertheless, the media compete for public attention by creating the dramatized realities
that cognitively and emotionally engage the public (Rindova et al., 2006). Given this
need, journalists often use novelty as necessary to engage the audience with the
representation of a dramatized reality, as the unfamiliar attracts attention (Starbuck &
Milliken, 1988). To introduce novelty in their media coverage about an organization, the
media can adopt a diverse set of cognitive frames. For this reason, over time,
organizational-level sequence of events may be combined or replaced with industry or
societal ones and vice versa, leading to the adoption of different attributional frames and
the development of different types of celebrity. I theorize that changes over time in the
choice of frame in terms of sequence of events will foster changes in the attributional
frames adopted in media narratives. Cooperative dynamics are likely to occur when
media narratives shift from organizational- or industry-level frames of the sequence of
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events towards societal ones. Over time, this will foster the development of convergent
celebrity. On the other hand, competitive dynamics are likely to occur when media
narratives shift from societal-level frames of the sequence of events towards
organizational or industry ones. Over time, this will foster the development of individual
or organizational celebrity respectively. Stated formally:
Proposition 6: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in the
cognitive frames used in media narratives:
a) A change in the level of the sequence of events frame from either strong
organizational focus or strong industry focus towards a societal focus will increase the
likelihood of cooperative dynamics to develop over time.
b) A change in the level of the sequence of events frame from a societal focus
towards either strong organizational focus or strong industry focus will increase the
likelihood of competitive dynamics to develop over time.

Performance Implications
Previous literature has investigated the performance implications of individual
and organizational celebrity separately (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006), and in
doing so, it fails to provide an understanding of the consequences of these two constructs
when occurring together. I suggest that specific performance advantages and
disadvantages may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared
to the possession of either one. I discuss such implications as they are important in
providing insights into the complex ways in which different social approval assets
contribute to the determination of organizational performance.
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First, theory on individual and organizational celebrity suggests that by increasing
economic opportunities for an organization, these important social approval assets have
the potential to generate value for the organization (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al.,
2006). However, when celebrity is at the individual level, it can generate hubris and
overconfidence and this, over time, may lead to biased decision making processes
(Hayward et al., 2004). When celebrity individuals share celebrity with the organization,
such biases may be reduced as organizational-level attributions are combined with
individual ones by organizational constituents to explain organizational actions and
success, mitigating the attributions made at the individual level.
Second, individual celebrity is highly mobile across organizations as individuals
can change organizations. Once a celebrity individual leaves, so may the economic
opportunities associated with his/her celebrity. Also, previous research has shown that
when a new non-celebrity-CEO is appointed following a celebrity one, he/she is likely to
experience less favorable evaluations due to the use of contrast heuristics (Graffin,
Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013a). The combination of individual and organizational celebrity
may reduce some of these risks. When a celebrity CEO leaves a celebrity organization,
the economic opportunities associated with organizational celebrity are not lost. Also, it
may be the case that a celebrity organization will more likely be able to attract a new
celebrity CEO.
Third, both organizational and individual celebrity heighten not only the attention
that organizational constituents pay to an organization, but their expectations as well
(Graffin, Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012a). With increased attention, therefore, heightened scrutiny
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may also be expected when the organization either fails to meet the high expectations it
has generated, or is involved in negative events. It follows that the presence of the asset at
the other level may increase the speed at which economic opportunities are lost.
Fourth, research at the organizational level has shown that celebrity may foster
members’ alignment around a new understanding of what the organization is, but over
time, it may also impede further identity work among organizational members, as the
image projected in the media is too appealing to be challenged by the actual reality
experienced within the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). I suggest that, when a
celebrity CEO – that has developed hubris and has become overcommitted to the
strategic actions undertaken by the organization – leads a celebrity organization, the
concomitant presence of this social approval asset at both organizational level will
increase the risk of organizational identity captivation and reduce the ability of the
organization to implement change when needed.
To conclude, specific performance advantages and disadvantages may arise from
the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared to the possession of either one.
I did not develop formal propositions about such performance implications given that the
theoretical focus was on the development and co-evolution processes of these two
distinctive, yet highly interrelated, social approval assets.

Discussion
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications
Celebrity is a common phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova
et al., 2006) and has become an important aspect characterizing how organizations and
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their members are perceived by stakeholders and constituents. Within the context of
organizational studies, celebrity has been investigated at the individual – e.g. CEOs and
entrepreneurs – and organizational levels – e.g. Apple and Tesla. Being in the media
spotlight, these social actors become celebrities known and acclaimed by audiences,
within and beyond the boundaries of their industries.
Emerging from previous literature on celebrity is an initial appreciation of how
individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and a preliminary understanding of
their distinctive effects on organizational outcomes. However, research on these
constructs has largely proceeded independently, despite suggestions the two may be
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006). This has hampered our understanding of how
celebrity develops at one level or the other, how celebrity at different levels co-evolves
over time, and what are the performance implications of achieving celebrity across
multiple organizational levels. I addressed these limitations of the current literature on
organizational celebrity and provide multiple theoretical contributions.
First, I contribute to theory on celebrity by identifying factors affecting the
development of celebrity at different organizational levels. I suggest that celebrity
development at different organizational levels is affected by the resonance of individual
or organizational attributional frames. In doing so, I highlight how celebrity is developed
through a co-creation process where multiple social actors are involved (i.e. journalists,
organizations and organizational members), and move the theory a step further in
understanding why and how celebrity emerges at different organizational levels. This is
important since previous literature has shown that individual and organizational celebrity
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has different implications on organizational outcomes. Second, I contribute to theory on
celebrity by developing a theoretical model that addresses how individual and
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time. Oftentimes, celebrity individuals such as
CEOs or entrepreneurs are involved in an organization’s celebrity development process
(Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa. Yet, research thus far has not addressed this issue. I
suggest that changes i) in the frames packages within media reporting, ii) in the
organizational culture, and iii) in the identification processes the individual engages in,
will affect the development of cooperative or competitive celebrity dynamics. Third, I
contribute to theory on celebrity by discussing the potential performance implications of
these two constructs when occurring together. I suggest that specific performance
advantages and disadvantages may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity
when compared to the possession of either one. By investigating the organizational
implications of individual and organizational celebrity, I contribute to the strategic
management literature by theorizing about the relationship between a combination of
social approval assets and organizational competitive advantage.
Overall, the media affect organizational actions and performance by impacting the
prominence and perceptions of organizations and their members in the public mind.
Knowing how media coverage of business events comes about is the first step for
managing it. To this extent, the theoretical model developed here bares important
practical implications, as it lends understanding of under what circumstances the media
adopt an organizational and/or an individual frame. Given that these social approval
assets have been shown to have different effects on organizational outcomes,
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organizations experiencing high levels of media coverage framed at the individual level
should consider taking actions to increase the resonance of organizational attributional
frames. Therefore, attention should be given to monitor the type of media coverage that
an organization and its members receive so that specific actions can be taken to foster the
adoption of specific attributional frames.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
There are limitations and boundary conditions inherent in my theorizing that
provide avenues for future research. First, I focus on business events that are already
salient to journalists as they represent a change from either organizational practices or
industry and societal norms. Such events are the ones that will more likely activate the
mechanism behind media attention. In doing so, I do not address the question of why the
media decide to focus attention on a specific set of business events to be narrated, but
rather focus on the choice of attributional frames after that decision is made. An
underlying characteristic of the business event, necessary for the development of both
organizational and individual celebrity, is the obtrusiveness of the event itself (Rindova et
al., 2006). Journalists are more likely to focus attention on change events – i.e. empirical
observations of difference in form, quality or state over time within an entity (Van de
Ven & Poole, 1995) – rather than reporting on the status quo (Rindova et al., 2006).
Given the specific purpose of this paper, I only focus on how a specific frame is chosen
over others, and assume that the frame is being applied to an event that has already
attracted media attention.
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Second, I only focus on business events that are perceived as positive, as they are
likely to elicit positive emotional responses from the audience and, consequently,
generate celebrity. Interestingly, the development process of causal attributions about
positive events may differ greatly from the development process of causal attributions
about negative events (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Rindova et al., 2006). To this extent, future
research is needed to understand how the model proposed in this essay would apply to the
development of individual and organizational infamy.
Third, I only discuss potential performance implications of the concomitant
occurrence of individual and organizational celebrity. I suggest that specific advantages
and disadvantages may be expected when celebrity occurs at both the individual and
organizational levels. Yet, I do not formally develop propositions about the relationship
between the possession of convergent celebrity and organizational performance, because
the theoretical focus is on the development and co-evolution of different levels of
celebrity. Future theorizing and empirical research is needed to address the
organizational-level implications of different levels of celebrity

Conclusion
Often CEOs and entrepreneurs or entire organizations become celebrities known
and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries.
Increased attention has been devoted to individual and organizational celebrity in the
context of organizational studies. In this essay, I have focused on understanding how and
why celebrity emerges at different organizational levels and how individual and
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time. I expect that the theory developed here will
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increase our understanding of this important social approval asset and stimulate further
research on the relationship between individual and organizational celebrity and their
influence on organizational performance.
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Appendix 1
Table 1.1. Framing packages.
Extract

Event

Narrative
Sequence of
Event - Frame

Attributional
Frame

“Down the road, Jobs has an even bigger
event planned. Rather than build a future
solely around Apple's 13-year-old
Macintosh computer, Jobs is expected to
bet the orchard on the nascent market for
so-called network computers, […].
Engineers are working overtime on a
sleek new design for a "MacNC,"
scheduled for release early next year.”
(Burrows, 1997)

Product
Release

Organizationallevel

Individual

“For the past couple of decades, using
remote controls to move little arrows and
click on strange symbols was a natural
way to control computers and other
electronic devices. Then along came the
iPhone, and suddenly dragging objects
around with a fingertip and making
things grow or shrink with a gesture
made mice and icons seem so 20th
century.” (Wildstrom, 2008)

Product
Release

Industry-level

Organization

“Business writers, like romance
novelists, love hyperbole. The paradigm
will shift. The good will be great. The
earth will move. But occasionally a new
technology comes along that really does
help society. Apple's tablet may just be
such a device. […] No one beats Steve
Jobs at making radical new hardware
designs undeniably cool.” (Kunz, 2010)

Product
Release

Societal-level

Convergent
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Figure 1.1. Focal-actor frame adoption and business celebrity.
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2. CHAPTER II CEO AND ORGANIZATIONAL CELEBRITY: INVESTIGATING
MEDIA ATTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGENCY
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Abstract
CEO and organizational celebrity have been identified as two important social
approval assets that have relevant, yet different, effects on organizational decision
making processes and performance (Rindova et al., 2006). This fertile body of research,
however, has mostly focused empirical efforts on investigating the consequences of
celebrity at different levels. Few empirical studies have investigated how celebrity is
achieved and how it may emerge at different organizational levels. This essay specifically
addresses this gap by investigating the factors that affect the adoption by the media of the
individual or organizational attributional frames that foster the creation of CEO and
organizational celebrity. Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and
organizational celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973),
and framing theory (Entman, 1993), I develop predictions on the factors that affect the
likelihood of CEO and organizational celebrity to emerge. I test the hypotheses on a
sample of 244 firms from the Fortune 500 and Unicorn lists over 15 years. The results of
show that the more the positive competitive actions undertaken by a company, the more
likely is the emergence of organizational celebrity, but not CEO celebrity. However,
contrary to current theory, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions does not
increase their efficacy in affecting the emergence of celebrity at either level.
Nevertheless, the frequency and distinctiveness of competitive actions become important
in determining celebrity when individual or organizational attributional frames are made
more salient through other information subsides, such as the presence of founder-CEO or
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the frames promoted in organizational communication materials. The results have
important theoretical, methodological and practical implications

Introduction
Celebrities are social actors that attract high levels of public attention, and elicit
positive emotional responses from the public (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Rindova et al.,
2006), through the mediating role of media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al., 2004; Rojek,
2004). Being an important phenomenon in modern society, the construct has attracted
attention across multiple disciplines (e.g. Austin et al., 2008; Hayward et al., 2004;
McCracken, 1989; Van de Rijt et al., 2013) and multiple levels of investigation.
Specifically, the choice of the focal level of analysis when studying celebrity has
influenced most of the research on this construct within organizational studies. On the
one hand, some scholars have focused attention at the individual level, addressing
questions about celebrity CEOs, founders, and other prominent individuals within
organizations (Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen et al., 2008; Ranft et al., 2007; Wade et al.,
2006, 2008). On the other hand, following the work of Rindova and colleagues on
celebrity firms (Rindova et al., 2006), other scholars have applied the concept at the
organizational level, examining the factors that build organizational celebrity and its
consequences for organizational performance (see Kjærgaard et al., 2011; Perryman,
2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010).
Overall, CEO and organizational celebrity have been identified as two important
social approval assets that have relevant, yet different, effects on organizational decision
making processes and performance (Rindova et al., 2006). Specifically, empirical
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evidence shows that the positive effects of CEO celebrity on organizational performance
tend to be short lived (Wade et al., 2006), and in the long term, this social approval asset
may be detrimental to the organization (Wade et al., 2006). On the other hand, celebrity
organizations receive greater market rewards when announcing positive earnings
surprises, and smaller market penalties when announcing negative earnings surprises
(Pfarrer et al., 2010).
This fertile body of research, however, has mostly focused empirical efforts on
investigating the consequences of celebrity at different levels. Few empirical studies have
investigated how celebrity is achieved and how it may emerge at different organizational
levels, and the theoretical efforts put forth to identify these processes need further
empirical investigation. Moreover, research on organizational and CEO celebrity has
proceeded largely independently, failing to address how and why this important social
approval asset emerges at different organizational levels. This essay specifically
addresses these gaps in the literature by investigating the factors that affect the adoption
by the media of the individual or organizational attributional frames that foster the
creation of CEO and organizational celebrity. This is important in consideration of the
fact that CEO and organizational celebrity seem to have different effects on
organizational outcomes, discussed above.
Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational
celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973), and framing
theory (Entman, 1993), I develop predictions on factors that affect the likelihood of CEO
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and organizational celebrity to emerge. I test hypotheses on a sample of 244 firms from
the Fortune 500 and Unicorn lists over 15 years.
The results have theoretical, methodological and practical implications. First, I
identify different antecedents of organizational and CEO celebrity, suggesting that these
social approval assets develop differently, and further theoretical development is needed
to better understand these differences. Second, results show strategic and industry
distinctiveness do not facilitate the emergence of celebrity at either level. This suggests
that, contrary to current theory on business celebrity, the business media may be more
prone to report about the status quo than previously thought. Third, from a
methodological perspective, I develop equivalent measures of individual and
organizational celebrity that are clearly distinct from measures used for operationalizing
other social approval assets (such as reputation and status) and allow for more direct
comparisons of celebrity across organizational levels. Lastly, from a practical standpoint,
the results of this study show that a firm has agency in affecting organizational celebrity
by framing its communication materials, particularly when the organization does not
behave too distinctively and, therefore, maintains legitimacy among its constituents.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
Celebrity
Generally speaking, a celebrity can be defined as a subject whose name has
“attention-getting, interest-riveting, and profit-generating value” (Rein et al., 1987: 15),
and there is large consensus on the fact that celebrities are well known social actors
whose existence is inextricably related to the media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al.,
54

2004; Rojek, 2004). When fame becomes a commodity produced and consumed by the
media, and the audience’s desire to gather information about the subject increases,
celebrity arises (Guthey, Clark, & Jackson, 2009; Rojek, 2004).
In the context of organizational studies, celebrity is conceptualized as an
intangible resource within the category of social approval assets (Pfarrer et al., 2010;
Rindova et al., 2006) and, as such, derives its value “from favorable collective
perceptions” (Pfarrer et al., 2010: 1131) that foster stakeholders’ willingness to exchange
resources with a firm (Rindova et al., 2006). Specifically, celebrities are defined as social
actors that attract high levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses
from their audiences through the mediating role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016;
Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a).
The first aspect of this definition deserves special attention because, in this essay,
I focus on two specific categories of social actors: individuals (i.e. CEOs) and
organizations. While the conceptualization of individuals as social actors is
straightforward (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010), the conceptualization of organizations as
social actors deserves further discussion. Social actors are distinguished from other
entities on the basis of the perception that other actors have about their ability to “make
decisions, and behave of their own volition” (King et al., 2010: 292). Building on Staw’s
(Staw, 1991) and Whetten and colleagues’ works (Whetten, Felin, & King, 2009), I adopt
the idea that organizations can be “thought of as social actors, complete with motives,
drivers and intentions” (Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009). Once constituted as
such, organizations represent more than the aggregation of their members or the mere
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representations of their environments. They behave in a purposeful manner and influence
individuals, communities and environments (King et al., 2010). Moreover, organizations
can be considered as social actors because their stakeholders and constituents (Zavyalova
et al., 2016a) grant them this status legally, practically and linguistically (King et al.,
2010). The definition of organizations as social actors is an important component of this
essay, as it is central to the nomological network of the organizational celebrity construct.
The theory on organizational celebrity suggests that it arises as the media attribute
industry or societal level change events to the volition of organizations that act
distinctively within their industries or society in general (Rindova et al., 2006).
Therefore, the organizational celebrity construct assumes that the media perceives and
represents organizations as social actors. Indeed, for organizational celebrity to emerge,
other social actors (the media) have to perceive the organization as a decision maker
capable of acting with some degrees of intentionality (King et al., 2010).
As previously mentioned, two different social actors have been the focus of most
research on celebrity in this field: CEOs and organizations. I briefly review the literature
on CEO and organizational celebrity in the following paragraphs.
CEO Celebrity. Current theory on CEO celebrity suggests that it arises as the
media attribute organizational actions and performance to the CEO (Hayward et al.,
2004). For example, the emergence of individual celebrity is related to media narratives
like this extract from a Bloomberg BusinessWeek article:
“While Jobs may still have some surprises up his sleeve, details are emerging that
show he plans to recast Apple from industry has-been to something more akin to highflier
Dell Computer Corp., the model PC maker of the future” (Burrows, 1997).
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CEO celebrity, therefore, is an outcome of the process through which the media
develop causal attributions at the individual level when reporting about business events
(Hayward et al., 2004). However, theory suggests that in order for CEO celebrity to
emerge, the organizational actions need to be distinctive (Hayward et al., 2004). When an
organization takes distinctive actions, media attention is likely to increase as the
organization becomes more salient (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Hayward et al., 2004). Also,
theory suggests that the likelihood that distinctive organizational actions will determine
CEO celebrity is increased when the CEO is associated with similar actions across
different contexts and circumstances (Hayward et al., 2004), as this will foster an
attribution to the CEO’s volition. Lastly, attributions of organizational actions to the
CEO’s volition are theorized to increase with the availability of information about a
CEO’s idiosyncratic behaviors (Hayward et al., 2004). The greater the media access to
information about the CEO persona, the more likely the emergence of CEO celebrity
(Hayward et al., 2004).
Empirical evidence shows that the media tend to overstate CEOs’ contributions to
firm performance. Leadership is often used as a chief explanatory factor to explain
organizational actions and success (Chen & Meindl, 1991; Meindl et al., 1985). Multiple
factors explain this tendency. First, in their sense-making of organizational events,
journalists are subjected to the fundamental attribution error – i.e. over-attributing a
behavior to the volition of the actor’s dispositional qualities (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977).
This general attribution phenomenon is due to the fact that individuals make causal
attributions to predict the future (Heider, 1944, 1958), and in doing so they prefer to
57

explain events in terms of “stable factors, such as the disposition of an actor, rather than
temporary ones, such as the characteristics of a situation” (Hayward et al., 2004: 638).
Following this approach, journalists tend to use CEOs’ dispositions as brief and simple
explanations for organizational actions and outcomes (Hayward et al., 2004). Second,
journalists work under great time pressure (Tuchman, 1978) managing a significant
amount of complex information and covering wide subject areas (Hayward et al., 2004)
while often possessing generalist knowledge (Gitlin, 1980). Accordingly, they tend to
adopt and rely on relatively simple and familiar explanations for organizational actions
and performance that do not require excessive data collection and interpretation
(Hayward et al., 2004; Kurtz, 2000; Rindova et al., 2006; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).
These conditions exacerbate the fundamental attribution error, and foster the tendency of
journalists to attribute organizational actions and outcomes to the CEO. Third, given that
people appreciate leadership as a simple and appealing explanation of organizational
actions (Staw & Sutton, 1992), media narratives centered on the CEO persona may be
more appealing to the public, fostering the propensity of journalists to center their
reporting about organizational events on the CEO (Hayward et al., 2004). In sum, due to
motivational and cognitive factors, information-processing constraints, and work
demands, journalists tend to interpret casually ambiguous organizational events using
leadership explanations (Hayward et al., 2004; Meindl et al., 1985).
When investigating the consequences of CEO celebrity, researchers sustain that,
by fostering higher expectations among organizational stakeholders, there can be benefits
and burdens (Cho, Arthurs, Townsend, Miller, & Barden, 2016; Graffin et al., 2012b;
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Zavyalova et al., 2016a) at both the individual and organizational level. CEO’s
compensation, for example, was found to be positively related to CEO celebrity, but this
effect is contingent on positive organizational performance (Wade et al., 2006). When
stakeholders’ higher expectations about organizational performance are disappointed,
CEO celebrity has a negative impact on compensation (Wade et al., 2006), and celebrity
CEOs are less likely to retain most of their compensation benefits (Graffin, Wade, Porac,
& McNamee, 2008). CEO celebrity can foster value creation at the organizational level
by fostering stakeholders’ expectations for higher quality and greater potential (Wade et
al., 2006), ultimately increasing stakeholders’ willingness to participate in the
organization (Rindova et al., 2006). Nevertheless, CEO celebrity may become
detrimental to organizational performance by fostering hubris and overconfidence in the
organization’s leader (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sinha et al., 2012), eventually
generating biases within the organization decision making process (Cho et al., 2016). The
more often individuals are exposed to certain information, the more likely they are to
adopt that information and believe it is accurate (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Hayward et al.,
2004). Consequently, the greater the celebrity of a CEO, the more likely he/she will be to
adopt the notion that he/she is the cause of the organization’s success (Hayward et al.,
2004). The internalization of such attributions will, over time, generate strategic inertia as
the CEO may become overly committed to the actions that have gained him/her celebrity
(Hayward et al., 2004). Empirical evidence shows that CEO celebrity has only a short
lived positive effect on organizational performance, and in the long-term it seems to
negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006). Organizations led by
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celebrity CEOs tend to pay higher premiums for target firms (Hayward & Hambrick,
1997) when prior performance deviates from the industry average (Cho et al., 2016).
Lastly, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across firms (e.g. CEO succession). It
follows that it cannot be considered as a stable strategic resource for the organization
(Graffin et al., 2012b).
Organizational Celebrity. Current theory on organizational celebrity suggests that
it arises as the media attribute industry or societal level changes to distinctive
organizations (Rindova et al., 2006). The emergence of organizational celebrity is
attributed to media narratives like this extract from this Forbes article:
“Uber is used to getting what it wants, wherever it wants. In 60 countries the ridehailing colossus has pursued an SUV-size take on Sun Tzu: Slip into a market by
surprise, quickly suffocate any competitors and--if this infuriates entrenched taxi lobbies
and government officials--never, ever back down. Uber has overcome violent taxi
protests, and dozens of places that once dubbed it "illegal" now have laws codifying its
business model--even the mayor of New York caved under an Uber-led outcry in July”
(Huet & Chen, 2015).
Organizational celebrity theory sustains that firms that undertake distinctive
actions and display distinctive organizational identities are more likely to become the
center of media attention, as journalists will use them as “vivid examples of important
changes in industries and society in general” (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). By putting these
organizations in the spotlight, the media try to emotionally engage their audiences
through the creation of a dramatized reality (Rindova et al., 2006). Once again, the more
that idiosyncratic information about the organization, its culture, identity, and activities
are available to the media to build such dramatized realities, the more likely is
organizational celebrity to emerge (Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a).
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When looking at the consequences of organizational celebrity, researchers found
that it affects organizational processes and outcomes. First, organizational celebrity has
been shown to have both a sense-making and self-enhancement effect on organizational
members (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). Over time, it can hinder identity work within an
organization, as the positive media attention received by the organization is too appealing
for its members to be disregarded. Even when it is in contrast with their direct experience
within the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011), the information publicized by the media
about the organization can provide building blocks in the members’ self-concepts and
identification processes (Dutton et al., 1994). At the organizational level, celebrity
organizations are more likely to announce positive earnings surprises, to receive greater
market rewards when announcing positive earnings surprises, and to receive smaller
market penalties when announcing negative earnings surprises (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
To summarize, empirical evidences suggest that at the individual level, CEO
celebrity is mobile across organizations and in the long term may be detrimental for
organizational performance. On the other hand, organizational celebrity seems to have
positive effects on organizational outcomes. Given these differences, understanding how
CEO and organizational celebrity emerge is of primary importance. As discussed above,
theory on celebrity claims that it emerges at both the individual and the organizational
level as CEOs and organizations undertake distinctive actions that set them apart from
their competitors. Such distinctive actions attract attention and make those organizations
and their leaders newsworthy. Yet, these well-established theoretical claims may
necessitate further empirical investigation, as most of the empirical research on the topic
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has focused on the consequences of celebrity (see Figure 2.12). By providing evidence of
the important effects of celebrity at both the individual and organizational level, this body
of literature not only contributes to strategic management and organizational theory, but
also legitimizes the need for further empirical research to investigate how these social
approval assets can be achieved.
Competitive Actions
Individuals are more likely to direct attention towards categories or stimuli that
are accessible and salient (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Accessibility refers to the fact that
recently and frequently activated ideas or topics come to mind more easily than ideas or
topics that have not been activated (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 60). Research shows that
accessibility affects individual’s encoding processes, as individual’s attention is primed
for categories and concepts that fit what they have thought about recently or frequently
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 60). Accessibility is the cognitive mechanism behind priming –
i.e. the effect of prior knowledge on the interpretation of new stimuli (Fiske & Taylor,
2013: 60). Priming research shows that stimuli are assimilated to accessible categories.
Once stimuli are attributed to certain categories over time, these repeated judgements can
become automatic (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), and individuals may not be aware of how
specific frames repeatedly surface in their interpretations of other social actors’
behaviors. Given that automatic activation can influence cognitive interpretations and
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Tables and Figures are reported in Appendix 2 at the end of Chapter 2
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behaviors (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), and frequently occurring stimuli are more likely to
dominate perception, be recalled and acted upon (Pollock et al., 2008), how do
organizations and CEOs become more or less accessible to the media?
Research shows that an organization’s competitive actions can function as signals
that shape a firm’s reputation among its constituents (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, &
Derfus, 2006; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007). In a study on reputation accumulation
of new entrants, Rindova and colleagues (Rindova et al., 2007) find that the company that
undertook more actions during the observation period, had the highest level of media
coverage (Rindova et al., 2007). By undertaking more competitive actions, organizations
are more likely to attract media attention, since more information will be potentially
available to the media (Basdeo et al., 2006). However, to attract positive media coverage,
the competitive actions undertaken by an organization need to have a positive
connotation. Negatively valued competitive actions, indeed, may be more likely to attract
negative media coverage, fostering the development of infamy (Zavyalova et al., 2016a)
Indeed, to generate celebrity, competitive actions need to have a certain degree of
legitimacy in the eye of the beholder, to be received and interpreted positively.
I suggest that the more positively charged competitive actions are undertaken by
the organization (Basdeo et al., 2006; Rindova et al., 2007), the more likely are both
organizational and CEO celebrity to emerge. Indeed, the accessibility attained through
positive competitive actions will likely affect the media decision to cover certain events
and organizations, but not the level of frame adopted in the story. Stated formally:
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Hypothesis 1a: The greater the ratio of positively valued competitive actions
undertaken by an organization, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to
emerge.
Hypothesis 1b: The greater the ratio of positively valued competitive actions
undertaken by an organization, the greater the likelihood of CEO celebrity to emerge.
Salience refers to the extent to which a specific stimulus stands out compared to
others in the immediate or larger environment (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 52); therefore,
salience is a property of a stimulus in its context, rather than an absolute characteristic of
the stimulus itself (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 52). Multiple causes of social salience have
been identified in the literature. Within social contexts, individuals tend to pay attention
to “expectancy-inconsistent information” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013:53). Social actors, like
the media, develop beliefs on the type of actions to be expected in a specific context
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rindova et al., 2006). When these expectations are disregarded,
attention increases. Consequently, when the actions taken are unusual for a) the subject
(e.g. behaving out-of-character) and/or b) the subject’s social category (e.g. behaving outof-role) they are more salient and, therefore, more likely to attract attention (Fiske &
Taylor, 2013). Overall, therefore, actions are perceived as distinctive when they diverge
from the kind of actions that are expected to occur in a given context.
Current theory on celebrity suggests that these kinds of actions are more likely to
attract media attention (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Actions that deviate
from the contextual norms are more likely to attract media attention because they
represent obtrusive events that deviate from expectations (Deephouse, 1999; Pollock,
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Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; Rindova et al., 2006). Distinctive actions are more salient
and, therefore, more likely to be noticed and become the focus of attention (Fiske &
Taylor, 2013).
Salient external stimuli are more likely to activate encoding processes, and to be
transformed into internal representations; consequently, stories about change are deemed
more newsworthy than stories about the status quo (Rindova et al., 2006). Therefore,
distinctive actions that are positively evaluated are likely to contribute to the development
of celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Heckert & Heckert, 2002; Rindova et al., 2006). Also,
action distinctiveness is likely to strengthen the relationship between the positive
competitive actions and both organizational and CEO celebrity. Indeed, the accessibility
attained through positive competitive actions, and the saliency attained through the high
distinctiveness of those competitive action will likely affect the media decision to cover
certain events and organizations, but not the level of frame adopted in the stories.
Consequently, I expect that the greater the action distinctiveness, the greater the
likelihood that the ratio of positively valued competitive actions will foster the
development of organizational and CEO celebrity. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2a: Action distinctiveness strengthens the positive relationship
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions undertaken by an organization
and the likelihood of organizational celebrity to emerge.
Hypothesis 2a: Action distinctiveness strengthens the positive relationship between the
ratio of positively valued competitive actions undertaken by an organization and the
likelihood of CEO celebrity to emerge.
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Communication Materials
Wire agencies and corporate communication materials represent very important
sources of information used by journalists to develop news content (Blyskal & Blyskal,
1985; Rindova et al., 2006). Public relations activities tend to have a strong influence on
the media agenda (Cameron et al., 1997; Kiousis et al., 2006; Lee & Solomon, 1990).
Using a diverse set of communication tools, public relations professionals provide
information subsidies to journalists to affect the content of media coverage (Kiousis et
al., 2006). On average, journalists estimate that 44% of news media content in the United
States is affected by public relations practitioners (Sallot & Johnson, 2006). Such
information subsidies are important to journalists as they decrease the time necessary to
develop a news story and minimize the associated costs (Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001).
Specifically, press releases have been found to have a particularly important role in the
process of agenda-building (Kiousis et al., 2006; Tedesco, 2001). In the business context,
Pollock and colleagues found in a study on IPOs a correlation of .42 between the volume
of press releases and the volume of media coverage (Pollock & Rindova, 2003).
Investigating corporate takeovers, Ohl and colleagues found that organizational press
releases influence the frequency of coverage as well as the interpretations adopted by
journalists in their coverage of these events (Ohl et al., 1995). It follows that
organizational press releases not only influence the likelihood of certain organizational
events to be reported, but also how they are framed in the media agenda.
Firms tend to rely on carefully planned communications, given the importance of
organizational communication materials in the construction of the media agenda, as they
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try to manage the impressions of stakeholders and to project desired images to their
audiences (Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2005; Rindova et al., 2006). By framing
(Entman, 1993) the communications to the media, an organization makes judgments in
deciding what to say about a certain event, and such decisions influence the way the
event is understood by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). As social actors,
organizations have self-presentation goals and attempt to “enhance their respectability
and impressiveness in the eyes of constituents” (Highhouse et al., 2009: 1481). The
information communicated by organizations through public relations experts represents
an output of such self-presentation goals. Public relations professionals act as “frame
strategists” (Hallahan, 1999: 224) that, providing idiosyncratic information about the
CEO persona, organizational actions, and organizational culture, can exert their agency in
the development of media narratives about organizational life.
For the purposes of this essay, special attention is given to the effect of causal
attributions within organizational communication materials on the development of
journalists’ causal attributions. I suggest that, given the great influence of organizational
communication material on the development of media reporting, the attributional frames
reported in such materials will moderate the relationship between competitive actions and
the emergence of celebrity. This is due to multiple reasons. First, the presence of specific
levels of attributional frames within organizational communication materials will foster
the accessibility and salience of those frames in the mind of the journalists. Events are
more likely attributed to salient causes (Kelley & Michela, 1980) and the attention paid to
specific attributional frames in the organizational communication materials will foster the
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prominence of those frames, increasing recall and crystallizing media interpretations
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Furthermore, given the constraints of the journalistic profession
(Hayward et al., 2004; Tuchman, 1978), reporters are more likely to reinforce familiar
explanations by gathering few additional sources of supporting evidence, rather than
actively seeking disconfirming ones (Hayward et al., 2004). To the extent, that a specific
attributional frame is made available to the media through organizational communication
materials, it will become more familiar, consequently increasing the likelihood of its
adoption.
To summarize, due to the large use of organizational communication materials in
media reporting about organizational life, increased accessibility and salience, and the
constraints of the journalistic profession, I expect that the presence of individual (or
organizational) frames within organizational communication materials to the media
affects the relationship between distinctive and positively valued competitive actions and
the emergence of celebrity. I suggest that the more the distinctive and positively valued
competitive actions are coupled with organizational-framed communication materials, the
more likely is organizational celebrity to emerge. The availability of organizational
frames will minimize the need to resort to entirely new attributions, considerably
decreasing the time needed to develop a news story. On the other hand, the more the
distinctive and positively valued competitive actions coupled with CEO-framed
communication materials, the more likely is CEO celebrity to emerge. In these situations,
an individual attributional frame is made more accessible and salient in the mind of the
journalists as they build their narratives. Stated formally:
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Hypothesis 3a: Organizational-focused communication materials strengthen the
likelihood that distinctive and positively valued competitive action will foster the
emergence of organizational celebrity.
Hypothesis 3b: CEO-focused communication materials strengthen the likelihood
that distinctive and positively valued competitive action will foster the emergence of CEO
celebrity.
CEO Tenure
Temporal information about a cause and its effect is often used to develop causal
attributions (Kelley, 1973). Psychology research suggests that causality cannot be
observed directly, and although certain events seem to solicit immediate causal
attributions, individuals still have to resort to interpretative processes to assess causality,
as nothing in the event itself can assure causal relations (Buehner, 2005). Individuals tend
to apply multiple principles to infer causality from the temporal correlation between
cause and effect (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989). Specifically, attribution theory
suggests that temporal contiguity is an important criterion in the formation of causal
attributions. Essentially, this concept refers to the idea that to form a causal attribution,
the effect and its cause should occur in temporal proximity (Kelley & Michela, 1980).
Moreover, ambiguities about cause and effects are addressed through the rule of temporal
precedence that assumes a cause should precede its effect (Kelley & Michela, 1980
1294).
In the context of this essay, the timing of the observed event is an important factor
in the development of journalists’ attributions, with specific respect to the CEO’s tenure
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within the organization. Research in the upper echelon tradition (Hambrick, 2011;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has found that organizations tend to become reflections of
their top management, and that CEOs characteristics such as personality and functional
background can predict organizational strategic actions (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick,
2006). Given the central role played by CEOs in organizational life, CEOs’ successions
tend to be considered newsworthy events and are often covered by the media. Also, when
selecting a new CEO, boards of directors attempt to identify someone with competences
and experiences in line with the specific conditions of the organization (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996; Henderson et al., 2006). Typically, CEOs take office with a certain
degree of awareness about the mandate they were hired to fulfill (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Such awareness is also likely shared
with shareholders and other external stakeholders such as analysts and business media. I
expect that CEO’s tenure at the time of the event will affect the causal attributions
developed by the media. Lastly, attribution theory claims that to the extent that a given
outcome occurs in the presence of a particular social actor, and not in the presence of
other social actors, casual attribution is more likely to occur (Kelley, 1973).
Overall, I suggest that when distinctive competitive actions occur closely
(temporal contiguity) after (temporal precedence) the appointment of a new CEO,
journalists are led to more strongly attribute those events to the new individual rather than
to the organization, since the event is not aligned with the organization’s behavioral
history, or industry norms (Hayward et al., 2004; Kelley, 1973), and it happens in closer
proximity to the CEO’s appointment. Consequently, I expect that when an organization
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undertakes more positively valued competitive actions that are also highly distinctive,
and this happens early in the tenure of the CEO, the media will be more likely to adopt
individual level attributions, consequently fostering the likelihood of CEO celebrity to
emerge. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 4: Shorter CEO tenure strengthens the likelihood that distinctive and
positively valued competitive actions will foster the emergence of CEO celebrity.
CEO Founder Role
Framing occurs at multiple levels: in the culture, in the mind of elites and
professional communicators, in the texts of communication, and in the minds of the
audience (Entman et al., 2009). Therefore, framing should be interpreted as a diachronic
process where in their choice of frames, journalists are bounded by the cultural stock of
schemas commonly found in a society which record the traces of past framing (Entman et
al., 2009). Not all frames are equally potent. Certain frames have a natural advantage
because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes. In general,
resonance increases the appeal of a frame as it makes a frame appear natural and familiar.
Overall, resonance not only facilitates the effect of the frame on the final audiences but
also the likelihood that a frame will be adopted by journalists, given that journalists and
audiences are in the same culture (Gamson & Modigliani, 1994).
Entrepreneurship is a popular frame in modern society (Shane, 2008). A Google
search for the word “entrepreneur” returns 227 million results. Also, the Google Ngram
Viewer (i.e. an online search engine that plots frequencies of search string using a yearly
count found in the Google’s text corpora of printed material between 1500 and 2008)
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shows that the words “entrepreneur”, “entrepreneurs” and “entrepreneurship” have
become more and more common over time. Entrepreneurs are often regarded as modern
heroes, and viewed as larger-than-life individuals (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). “The
notion of a risk taker who bucks the odds to build a business empire captures the
twentieth century imagination in much the same way that great explorers of earlier years
invigorated their countryman” (Rubenson & Gupta, 1992:53). This myth about
entrepreneurship appeals to media audiences as it portrays heroic stories of individuals
that, overcoming great challenges, become successful (Shane, 2008). Such
entrepreneurship myths saturate all types of media (Shane, 2008), providing a
romanticized view of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2008; Wood & Holcomb, 2011).
As entrepreneurial myths are widely available in the broader culture of western
societies (Shane, 2008), when the CEO is the founder of the organization, he is more
likely to become the face of the organization, thus fostering the development of
leadership-based dramatic narratives. I theorize that the underlying ideology of
entrepreneurial agency (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005) permeating modern culture makes
CEOs attributions more likely to emerge in media narratives about organizations led by a
founder. Therefore, I expect that when an organization undertakes positively valued
competitive actions that are highly distinctive, and this happens under the leadership of a
founder CEO, the media will more likely to adopt individual level attributions and,
consequently, foster CEO celebrity.
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Hypothesis 5: When the CEO is also the founder the likelihood that distinctive
and positively valued competitive action will foster the emergence of CEO celebrity is
stronger.
The conceptual models are reported in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3.

Method
Sample
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 244 companies over 16 years
(between 2000 and 2015), for a total of 3,245 observations. Over 50% of the sample was
observed for all the time periods, and over 75% of the sample is observed for 10 time
periods or more. Companies that were not observed for all the time periods were founded
after the first time period (year=2000) and, therefore, appear in the panel at later times.
The companies in the sample were selected in 2016 from the Fortune 500 and the
Unicorn lists, between 2001 and 2015. The Fortune 500 list includes U.S. based
companies ranked by total revenues. The Unicorn list includes privately-held
organizations with market valuations over $1 billion, ranked by valuation, and is based
on a combination of data from PitchBook, CB Insights, news reports and Fortune’s own
investigation. The combination of these lists allows both established and entrepreneurial
companies in the sample.
Certain industries may attract higher levels of media attention. Organizations
operating in those industries are, therefore, more likely to attract media attention, as a
function of the industry they operate in. Nevertheless, organizations operating in less
newsworthy industries may still achieve celebrity as a function of their distinctive
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behaviors. By selecting organizations in industries that experience different levels of
overall media attention, it is possible to unpack differences on how celebrity emerges
within environments that are more or less conducive to its development. The Factiva
database was used to selected different industries based on their overall media visibility
in 2013. Industries with high, medium and low media coverage were identified and
selected, and the final sample, therefore, consisted of an industry-stratified sample based
on industry visibility. The sample composition is reported in Table 2.1.
Dependent Variables
Organizational Celebrity. Organizational celebrity was measured as the volume
and tenor of media coverage an organization received (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Media
volume was operationalized as the total number of articles published about an
organization each year in Forbes and Bloomberg BusinessWeek, as the type of articles
published in these magazines are likely to have the depth and breadth needed to develop
the dramatized realities that foster the development of celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
Both magazines are among the most read business magazines in the U.S. with a total
circulation of 980,000 in 2016 for Bloomberg BusinessWeek3, and a readership of over 46
million across multiple platforms for Forbes in spring 2015.4 The articles (a total of
8,824) were obtained through a search by company name within the Factiva database.
Following previous practice in measuring organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010),

3
4

https://www.bloomberg.com/company/bloomberg-facts/.
http://www.statista.com/statistics/191742/us-magazine-audiences-2010-forbes/
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firms in the top quartile of media visibility in a given year were coded as 1 for media
volume (0 otherwise).
Each article was then content analyzed to assess the tenor of media coverage, by
identifying the degree of positive and negative affective language present in each article
(Pfarrer et al., 2010). The Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) dictionary of more
than 900 affective words (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) was used to content
analyze the articles. Following established procedure in the study of celebrity, I created a
ratio of each article’s positive affective content to its total affective content (Pfarrer et al.,
2010; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). An article was coded as positive if its
total affective language was at least 60 percent positive, and negative if its total affective
content was at least 60 percent negative (Pfarrer et al., 2010). The overall affective
resonance of media coverage was measured as the difference between the number of
positive and the number of negative articles published about a company in a given year
(Zavyalova et al., 2012).5 Firms in the top quartile of tenor of coverage, in a given year,
were coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Firms that were in the top quartile for both visibility and
tenor, in a given year, were coded as celebrity (1, 0 otherwise) (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
CEO Celebrity. Following the same methodology used for the operationalization
of organizational celebrity, CEO celebrity was measured as the volume and tenor of
media coverage about the CEOs of the companies in the sample. The articles were

5

The analyses were also conducted using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Pfarrer et al. 2010).
The results remained essentially unchanged.
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obtained through a search by CEO name within the Factiva database, for a total of 1,539
articles. Following an equivalent approach to the measure of organizational celebrity,
companies with a CEO in the top quartile of media visibility, in a given year, were coded
as 1 for media volume (0 otherwise). Once again, each article was content analyzed using
the LIWC dictionary for affective words and coded as positive, negative or neutral
according to its affective content (Pfarrer et al., 2010). The overall affective resonance of
media coverage was measured as the difference between the number of positive and the
number of negative articles published about a CEO in a given year (Zavyalova et al.,
2012).6 Firms in the top quartile of tenor of the CEO coverage, in a given year, were
coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Firms that were in the top quartile for both CEO visibility and
tenor, in a given year, were coded as having CEO celebrity (1, 0 otherwise).
As articles about organizations are likely to mention the CEO and vice versa, each
article was assigned to organizational or CEO celebrity based on the total number of
times each of these social actors was mentioned in the text. Specifically, an article was
assigned to the organization when the total number of mentions of the organization
divided by the total number of mentions of the organization and the CEO combined was
equal to or above 70%. An article was assigned to the CEO when the total number of

6

The analyses were also conducted using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Pfarrer et al. 2010).
The results remained substantially unchanged.

76

mentions of the organization divided by the total number of mentions of the organization
and the CEO combined was equal to or below 70%.7
Independent Variables
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions. Following previous literature on
competitive dynamics, competitive actions was defined as “externally directed, specific,
and observable moves initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position” (Connelly,
Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2016: 8) The RavenPack News Analytics database
was used to collect data about a company’s competitive actions. This database collects
information on companies and other types of entities by monitoring the Dow Jones
Financial Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s and
MarketWatch, as well as over 19,000 online sources including business publishers,
national and local news and blogs, and 22 newswire and press releases distribution
networks including PRNewswire, Canadian News Wire, LSE Regulatory News Service
and others (RavenPack, 2015). Using a computerized approach to text analysis,
RavenPack allows the collection of reliable data on competitive actions, by identifying all
the entities mentioned in a story, categorizing the event reported in a story, and coding
the role played by each entity in a story (Connelly et al., 2016). For the purpose of this
essay, and following previous literature on competitive dynamics, I focused on eight

7

The cut-off point was chosen after considering the frequency distribution of CEO and organizational
mentions in the corpora of articles. The analyses were conducted at different percent levels (80-20 percent,
90-10 percent). The results remained substantially unchanged.
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types of competitive actions (Connelly et al., 2016; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith,
2008; Ferrier, 2001). Specifically, I collected information on actions relating to: new
product, capacity, pricing, marketing, acquisitions, strategic alliances, market expansion,
and legal matters. Table 2.2 reports headlines examples for each action category, as well
as the RavenPack classification. Overall, I identified 28,598 unique competitive actions
for the companies in the sample, during the time covered by the panel. This corresponds
to an average of 8.81 actions per company per year, which is in line with prior research
on competitive dynamics (Connelly et al., 2016).
The RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score (ESS) – a sentiment analysis that
quantifies positive and negative perceptions of the events reported in the stories – was
then used to identify positive competitive actions that may lead to the positive media
coverage needed to attain organizational and CEO celebrity. RavenPack ESS is a score
between 0 and 100 that measure the news sentiment for a given organization by
combining different proxies. Values of 50 indicate neutral sentiment, values above 50
indicate positive sentiment and values below 50 indicate negative sentiment (RavenPack,
2015). The score is obtained by combining the RavenPack Experts Consensus
Methodology with analyses and computations of quantitative and qualitative information,
when provided in the news about the event (RavenPack, 2015). Specifically, the Expert
Consensus Methodology entails an automated computer classification algorithm, based
on the results of financial experts’ classification of specific events. In details, financial
experts’ opinions about the likelihood of an event to have positive or negative
consequences on the stock price of a given company are used to develop a training
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classification algorithm (RavenPack, 2015). Furthermore, the ESS sentiment score has a
strength component that is influenced by a variety of quantitative and qualitative
information – e.g.: magnitude of the event, analyst ratings, comparison of actual versus
estimated values – when available in the news (RavenPack, 2015). The ratio of positive
competitive actions was obtained by dividing the number of competitive actions with an
ESS above 50 over the total number of actions undertaken by a company in a given year8.
Actions Distinctiveness. Action distinctiveness was operationalized in terms of
distinctiveness toward an organization’s strategic history – i.e. the degree to which a
given set of strategic actions undertaken by an organization differs from the actions
undertaken by the same organization in a previous time period – and toward industry
norms – i.e. degree to which a given set of strategic actions undertaken by an
organization differs from the actions undertaken by other organizations in the same
industry.
First, following the procedure by Ferrier and colleagues (Ferrier, Smith, &
Grimm, 1999), strategic distinctiveness was measured as an Euclidean distance measure
across actions types (Ferrier et al., 1999). The sum of the squared differences in the
proportions of competitive actions carried out across all action categories was calculated
following the formula:

8

Higher cut-off points were also considered (e.g. ESS = 60 and ESS=70). However, the ESS seem to be a
conservative measure of positivity of competitive actions. Higher cut-off points would consider new
product releases, new market entry, joint ventures and partnerships as well as construction of new or
upgrades of facilities as non-positive events. To this extent, the ESS > 50 cut-off point was chosen.
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Σa (Ia,t/It – Ia,t-1/It-1)2,
where Ia,t is the frequency of the firm’s actions in the ath action category of company I in
a given year, It is the total count of firm’s actions in the same time period for company I,
Ia,t-1 is the frequency of actions in the ath action category for the same organization in the
previous year, and It-1 is the total count of actions for the same organization in the
previous year. A low score indicates that the entire set of actions changes only little
across time periods. A high score signifies that the entire set of actions changes greatly
across time periods.
Second, industry distinctiveness was measured as an Euclidean distance measure
across action types (Ferrier et al., 1999). The sum of the squared differences in the
proportions of competitive actions carried out across all action categories was measured
following the formula:
Σa (Ia,t/It – Ca,t/Ct)2,
where Ia,t is the frequency of the firm’s actions in the ath action category of company I, It
is the total count of firm’s actions in the same time period for company I, Ca,t is the
frequency of actions in the ath action category for the other companies in the same
industry, and Ct is the total count of actions for the other companies in the same industry
in the same time period. A low score will indicate that the entire set of actions changes
only little across companies. A high score will signify that the entire set of actions
changes greatly when compared to industry norms.
CEO Tenure. CEO tenure was measured as the years elapsed since the
appointment of the CEO. Information about a CEO’s tenure was collected using the
80

ExecuComp Database, LinkedIn, Factiva database, and other online sources such as
personal and company websites.
CEO Founder Role. Founder role was operationalized as a dummy variable
coded as 1 if the CEO is also part of the founding team (0 otherwise). Information about a
CEO’s founder role were collected using LinkedIn, Factiva, and other online sources
such as personal and companies’ websites.
Frames in Organizational Press Releases. To assess the types of frames used in
the organizational communication materials I content analyzed organizational press
releases (PR). A search for each company in the sample was conducted within the
Business Wire and Factiva Press Releases Service sources, and returned a total of
130,384 PR. Each PR was content analyzed to identify the predominance of an individual
or organizational frame. Organizational prominence was measured as the number of
organization mentions and divided by the total number of mentions of the organization
and CEO combined. Specifically, a PR was assigned to the organization when the ratio
was equal to or above 90%, and to the CEO when the ratio was equal or below 90%.9

9

Organizations are often mentioned multiple times within a PR, and some of these mentions serve to
provide contact and legal information. The cutoff point was chosen by looking at the distribution of the
ratio here described, and keeping into account this overall prevalence of organizational mentions within
organizational press releases. The analyses were conducted looking at different cutoff points and the results
remained substantially unchanged.
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Control Variables
To account for other possible explanations several control variables were
included. First, Year fixed effects were introduced to account for the influence of
aggregate trends. Second, positive organizational performance may attract positive media
coverage, therefore, I controlled for the Ratio of positive performance announcements.
Performance announcements were chosen as a measure of performance as they were
available for both Fortune 500 and Unicorns10 companies; moreover, performance
announcement, being directly available to the media, are likely to generate media
coverage and are, therefore, extremely relevant for the purpose of this essay. This
information was obtained using the RavenPack database, and operationalized as the
number of positive performance announcements over the total number of performance
announcements by a company in a given year (see Table 2.3). Also, I controlled for the
number of Awards received by a company in a given year, as such events often generate
positive media coverage. Once again, information about these events was collected
through the RavenPack database (see Table 2.3).11 Lastly, I controlled for the previous
year level of organizational celebrity and CEO celebrity.

10

As privately held corporations, financial information for companies in the Unicorns list was not readily
available.
11
For the analyses that did not used fixed effect estimations, industry and company type (Fortune 500 vs.
Unicorns) were also used as control variables.
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Data Description and Analysis
Table 2.4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables in
this essay. Comparing within and between variation, some of the variables of theoretical
interest have greater between than within variation (see Table 2.4), so within estimation
may lead to considerable efficiency loss (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).
Organizational Celebrity. Overall, 84.35% of the company-year observations did
not have organizational celebrity, and 15.65% did. The between summary indicates that
of the 244 companies in the sample, 239 (97.95%) did not have celebrity at least onetime
during the time considered by the panel, and 117 (47.95%) had celebrity at least once.
Therefore, of the companies in the sample, 45.90% changed at least once from celebrity
to non-celebrity organization, or vice versa (see Table 2.5). The within summary
indicates that 87.44% of the companies that did not have celebrity in at least one time
period, never achieved it during the time covered by the panel, and 29.92% of the
companies that had celebrity maintained it for all the time periods covered by the panel.
The data also show persistence in organizational celebrity over time. Looking at the
transition probabilities (see Table 2.6) from one period to the next, 59.62% of the
observations with celebrity for one year maintained it during the following year of
observation. On the other hand, 91.87% of observations with no celebrity for one year
maintained the no-celebrity during the following year. The first order autocorrelation of
organizational celebrity is .507; when considering all lags, autocorrelation varies little
with lag length, and no discernible patterns can be identified.
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CEO Celebrity. Overall, 87.06% of the company-year observations did not
achieve CEO celebrity over the time periods considered in the panel, and 12.94% did.
The between summary indicates that of the 244 companies in the sample, 243 (99.59%)
did not had CEO celebrity at least one time over the time periods covered by the panel,
and 119 (48.77%) had CEO celebrity at least once (see Table 2.5). This means that, of the
sampled companies, 48.36% changed at least once from CEO celebrity to non-CEOcelebrity, or vice versa. The within summary indicates that 26.33% of companies that
ever had CEO celebrity, always had it over the time period consider in the panel, and
87.52% that did not have CEO celebrity never achieved it. Of the company-year
observations that ever had CEO celebrity in one period, 51.68% maintained it for the
following year. And for those who did not have CEO celebrity in one period, 92.12%
remained without CEO celebrity for the following year (see Table 2.6). The first order
autocorrelation of organizational celebrity is .430; when considering all lags,
autocorrelation seems to decrease with lag length.
Overall, the data seem to suggest that organizational and CEO celebrity are
equally difficult to achieve as about 92% of the observations without celebrity (at either
level) do not achieve it the following year. On the other hand, CEO celebrity seem to be
more volatile than organizational celebrity, as about 52% of the observations with CEO
celebrity maintained it for the following year, while about 60% of the observations with
organizational celebrity maintained it for the following year (see Table 2.6).
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Analytical Approach
Multiple estimation models are available for panel data. First, cross-sectional
ordinary lease square (OLS) regression assumes that the vector of predictor variables (x)
in the equation:
yit = βxit + uit
can change across i and t, and it assumes that xit and uit are not correlated. Such an
assumption is potentially spurious with panel data with repeated measures over time. In
these situations, pooled OLS can be used, as the Huber-White sandwich estimate (HWS)
allows handling potential correlation between predictors and error term. Using the HWS
estimate add an unobservable component (ci) to the error term to account for the
possibility that a component of the error term is correlated with the predictors. Second,
generalized least squares (GLM) estimators with random effects and OLS estimators with
conditional fixed effects also can be used with panel data. These models help managing
issues with potential unobserved heterogeneity between predictors and unobserved
variables (Petersen, 1993), but in different ways. Similarly, to pooled OLS, random and
fixed effects estimators include an omitted variable component (ci) in the regression
equation:
yit = βxit + ci + uit
Random effect and fixed effects models both assume that the predictors are strictly
exogenous from the error term (E[uit | xi, ci] = 0). However, random effects models make
the extra assumption that the observed variables are not correlated with the unobserved
ones (E[ci | xi] = 0). On the other hand, fixed effects models specifically allows for
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E(ci|xi) to be a function of xi (Wooldridge, 2010). Fixed effects models can control for all
unmeasured variables that are fixed over time, allowing consistent estimates
(Wooldridge, 2010). However, fixed effects models, tend to use data less efficiently as
they cannot estimate time-invariant variables, and tend to estimate poorly coefficients for
predictors that vary only slightly over time (Wooldridge, 2010). To test the consistency
of random effects estimator, I run the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), comparing the
difference between the coefficients estimated with the fixed effect, against the
coefficients estimated with the random effects. The results, for both organizational and
CEO celebrity indicate that the random effect would not produce consistent estimates
and, therefore, fixed effects estimation should be used.
A fixed effect non-linear model assumes that ci (a company effect) is an
unobserved random variable that may be correlated with the regressors xit. In short panels
the joint estimation of the N incidental parameters ci and xi could lead to inconsistent
estimation of all parameters as there are only Ti observations for each ci. For the logit
model, however, it is possible to use the conditional maximum likelihood estimator to
eliminate αi from the estimation equation. Base on a log density for the ith company that
conditions on ΣTit=1 yit the total number of outcomes equal to 1 for a given company over
time, the resulting model is a logit with the regressors xi2 -xi1. Given this specificity of the
estimation model, time invariant coefficients cannot be estimated. Also, this leads to the
loss of those observations where yit is 0 for all Ti or yit is 1 for all Ti (Cameron & Trivedi,
2010).
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Results
Organizational Celebrity
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a test the probability that a company will have
organizational celebrity contingent on the ratio of positively valued competitive actions it
undertakes, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions, and the focus of its
organizational communication materials. The results are reported in Table 2.7. As
discussed earlier, about 87% of the companies that did not have celebrity in at least one
time period never achieved it during the time periods covered by the panel, and about
30% of the companies that had celebrity maintained it for all the time periods covered by
the panel. Given the estimation model discussed above, those observations cannot be
included in the analysis, leading to a significant loss of efficiency (N= 1,471; n=110).
Model 1 in Table 2.7 reports the results when only control variables and year
fixed effects are accounted for. The greater the ratio of positive performance
announcements, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur (β=0.545,
p=.001). This means that the odds ratio (OR) of achieving organizational celebrity
increase to 1.725 following a 1 standard deviation increase in the ratio of positive
performance announcements released by a company in a given year. CEO celebrity in the
previous year has a positive but only marginally significant effect on the likelihood of
achieving organizational celebrity the following year (β=0.438, p=0.059). The odds of
achieving organizational celebrity increase to 1.550 if the company had CEO celebrity
the previous year. The number of awards received by a company in a given year, the
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CEO tenure or the CEO founder role, and previous level of organizational celebrity12 do
not significantly affect the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur.
In hypothesis 1a, I suggest the greater is the ratio of positively valued competitive
actions the greater will be the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur. To test this
hypothesis, in Model 2 the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to the
equation. The results show that the greater the ratio of positively valued competitive
actions undertaken by a company, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to
occur (β=0.247, p=0.048). Following a 1 standard deviation increase in the ratio of
positive competitive actions undertaken by a company in a given year, the odds of
achieving organizational celebrity increase to 1.281. Also, the effect remains significant
even after accounting for strategic and industry distinctiveness (see Model 3 and 4 in
Table 2.7), showing strong support for hypothesis 1a. Nevertheless, the AIC fit statistic
shows that Model 2 fits the data only slightly better, when compared to the model with
only control variables, and the pseudo-R2 only increases of .020.
In hypothesis 2a, I suggest that the relationship between positively valued
competitive actions and organizational celebrity is stronger for high levels of action
distinctiveness. Model 6 in Table 2.7 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction
term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions and strategic

12

It is important to note once again that, given the estimation model, the sample could not include the
observations that either never achieved or always maintained organizational celebrity during the time
periods covered by the panel. This may explain why previous organizational celebrity does not significantly
affect the likelihood of achieving celebrity the following year.

88

distinctiveness, while model 7 considers an interaction effect with industry
distinctiveness. In both cases, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting no
support for hypothesis 2a.
In hypothesis 3b, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when a company focuses its
communication materials at the organizational level. Model 8 in Table 2.7 tests this
hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued
competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and organizational-focused PR. The 3-way
interaction term is significant, suggesting preliminary support for hypothesis 3a.
Moreover, the AIC fit statistic and the Pseudo-R2 show that the model fits the data better
when compared to the model with only control variables. Therefore, further steps were
taken to probe the nature of the interaction. First, I plotted the interaction to identify
whether the slopes follow the hypothesized pattern (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Jaccard
& Turrisi, 2003). The 2-way interaction between strategic distinctiveness and the ratio of
positive competitive actions13 is plotted in Figure 2.4 to provide a baseline. From the
graph, strategic distinctiveness seems to have a negative effect on the relationship
between the ratio of positive competitive actions and the likelihood of organizational
celebrity. Low strategic distinctiveness seems to be preferred to achieve celebrity (see
Figure 2.4). Things change, however, when high strategic distinctiveness is combined
with organizational-focused communication materials. Under the combined effect of

13

Data from Model 8 in Table 2.7.
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these moderators the slope seems to become positive, while it stays mostly unchanged for
low organizational-focused communication (see Figure 2.4), providing preliminary
support for H3b.
Interaction plots are useful to illustrate the nature of the relationship and to
provide a visual representation of the slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006). However, these
plots do not allow inferences about the significance of each slope, or the existence of a
significant difference among any pair of slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006). Given these
limitations, I took further steps to statistically probe the nature of this relationship.
Specifically, I conducted subgroup analyses (Aiken et al., 1991; Peters, O'Connor, &
Wise, 1984), dividing the sample with a median14 split for the variable organizationalfocused PR. The effects of the ratio of positive competitive actions and its interaction
with strategic distinctiveness were tested at high and low levels of organizational-focused
PR separately. The results are reported in Table 2.8 and, in line with the interaction plot,
show that the interaction term between the ratio of positive competitive actions and
strategic distinctiveness is significant only for high levels of organizational-focused PR,
suggesting further support for hypothesis 3a. To provide a visual representation of the
nature of this effect, I plotted these interactions (see Figure 2.5). The slopes show that for
the high organizational-focused PR sub-group, the relationship between ratio of
positively valued competitive actions and the likelihood of organizational celebrity is

14

The analyses were conducted with both a median and a mean split, producing consistent results. The
results of the median split are reported in Table 2.8, while the results of the mean split are available upon
request.
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stronger when combined with high level of strategic distinctiveness, again providing
further support for hypothesis 3a.
Lastly, to test the significance of each individual slope, I further split the sample
on high and low levels of strategic distinctiveness and tested the direct effects of the ratio
of positive competitive action on the likelihood of achieving organizational celebrity. The
OR resulting from this analysis are reported in Table 2.915. Not surprisingly, and similar
to the results of the previous subgroup analysis, the slopes are not significant in the 2
subgroups of low organizational-focused PR. However, from this analysis, the slope high
organizational-focused PR and low strategic distinctiveness is not significant. Although
these post hoc tests do not allow inference as to whether there is a significant difference
among any combination of the four slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006), the fact that only
the high-high slope is significant provides further support for hypothesis 3a. When
looking at the practical relevance of these results, the odds of achieving organizational
celebrity due to an increase in 1 standard deviation in the ratio of positively valued
competitive actions goes from 1.99 in the high strategic distinctiveness sub-group, to 3.38
in the high strategic distinctiveness and high organizational-focused PR sub-group.
Model 9 in Table 2.7 tests hypothesis 3a by including an interaction term between
the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and
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Given the loss of efficiency following the use of the conditional maximum likelihood estimator with
fixed effects (necessary to consistently estimate fixed effects non-linear models) previously discussed, this
further analysis was conducted with pooled-OLS estimation, adding year, industry, and company type fixed
effects and using cluster-robust standard errors.
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organizational-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that
there is not a 3-way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, partial support was found for
hypothesis 3a as organizational-focused PR interact with the ratio of positively values
competitive actions and with strategic distinctiveness in determining organizational
celebrity, but not with industry distinctiveness.
Robustness Analyses
To investigate the presence of influential observations that may be driving the
results, I obtained a plot of leverage points (Pregibon, 1981). From the scatterplot, two
observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results. I run the model again
without these observations and the results remained substantially unchanged.16 To correct
for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors where computed using the vce (Jackknife)
option. The lag-1 stationary autocorrelation of the residuals for company-year pairs range
from .113 to -.053, with an average of -0.042. This provides a rough estimate of the
interclass stationary correlation coefficient of the residuals. To test for multicollinearity,
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were investigated. For model 5 (only direct effects),
the VIFs were below 2.11 with an average of 1.62. For model 8 (3-way interaction with
strategic distinctiveness) the VIFs were below 3.44, with an average of 1.91. These
values are well below the 10 threshold (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004),
suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern. To investigate the potential for a
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Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in
Table 2.7, Table 2.8, and Table 2.9 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers
are available upon request.
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misspecification in the model, the linktest STATA command was used. The results
indicate that the model is properly specified.
Considering the significant efficiency loss caused by the conditional maximum
likelihood estimation with fixed effects, a further analysis was conducted using the
continuous data for organizational celebrity. Table 2.10 reports the results of the analysis
conducted with fixed effects estimation – following the results of the Hausman test
(Hausman, 1978) – and robust standard errors.
In model 1 only the control variables were entered. The results show that the ratio
of positive performance announcements has a positive effect on organizational celebrity
(β= 0.093, p=0.048), while the number of awards received seems to have a negative
effect (β= -0.258, p=0.031). Also, previous level of organizational celebrity positively
affects organizational celebrity the following year (β=0.686, p=0.000). CEO tenure, CEO
founder role and previous level of CEO celebrity, instead, do not affect organizational
celebrity when measured continuously.
In Model 2, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions was added to the
equation. The results show support for hypothesis 1a as the effect is positive and
significant (β=.033, p=.027), however, the AIC statistic and R2 show that the overall
model does not fit the data better than model 1, still the effect remains significant even
when strategic and industry distinctiveness are included (see model 3 and 4 in Table
2.10), providing further support for hypothesis 1a.
To test for hypothesis 2a, model 6 considers the interaction between the ratio of
positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness, and model 7 considers the
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interaction with industry distinctiveness. The results show no significant effect in both
cases, providing no support for hypothesis 2a.
To test for hypothesis 3a, model 8 considers the 3-way interaction between the
ratio of positive competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and organizational-focused
PR. The interaction term is significant (β= - 0.280, p=.013), and the model fits the data
better when compared to the model with only controls (AIC=6811.948; R2=0.796),
providing preliminary support for hypothesis 3a. To further probe the nature of this
relationship and provide a visual representation, I plotted the different slopes (Aiken et
al., 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). In Figure 2.6 the 2-way interaction between the ratio
of positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness is plotted to provide a visual
base-line. As to show that, contrary to expectations, but in line with the results from the
logistic models, there is not statistically significant or practically relevant interaction
between the ratio of positively competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness.
However, when plotting the 3-way interaction, the slopes suggest a positive relationship
between the ratio of positive competitive actions and organizational celebrity for high
organizational-focused PR under conditions of both high and low strategic
distinctiveness, and a negative relationship for low organizational-focused PR under
conditions of both high and low strategic distinctiveness. Given the limitations of the
plotting technique for probing interaction effects, I also conducted a significance test for
slope differences (Dawson & Richter, 2006). Such a test allows to assess whether the
slopes are statically different across different levels of the moderating variables. The
results indicate that all the slopes are statistically different from each other.
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Lastly, model 9 considers the 3-way interaction with industry distinctiveness. The
results show that the interaction term is significant (β= -0.575, p=0.010), and the model
fits the data better than the model with only controls (AIC=6748.567; R2=.798),
providing additional support for hypothesis 3a. Once again, to further investigate the
nature of this relationship I plotted the interaction (see Figure 2.7). The results show that
the slope is positive when high organizational-focused PR is combined with low industry
distinctiveness (slope 3 in Figure 2.7) and negative when low organizational-focused PR
is combined with low industry distinctiveness (slope 4 in Figure 2.7). However, the
results of the significance test for slope difference shows no statistically significant
difference in slopes 1 and 2, suggesting that the interaction with the focus of
organizational communication only matters when the company undertakes competitive
actions that are not too distinctive when compared to industry peers.
To ensure the robustness of the results for the continuous measure of
organizational celebrity, several steps were taken. First, to investigate the presence of
influential observations that may be driving the results, I obtained the Cook’s D, and a
leverage plot. Two observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). I run the model again without these observations
and the results remained essentially unchanged.17 Second, to detect heteroscedasticity, the
hettest STATA command was used and the results suggest the need to obtain robust
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Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in
Table 2.10 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers are available upon
request.
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standard errors. To test for multicollinearity, the VIFs were investigated. For model 5
(only direct effects), all the VIFs were below 2.67 with an average of 1.48. For model 8
(3-way interaction with strategic distinctiveness) the VIFs of two of the 2-way interaction
terms were above the 10 threshold. Also, for model 9 (3-way interaction with industry
distinctiveness) the VIFs of the interaction terms were above the 10 threshold (Kutner et
al., 2004). This is not surprising given that the moderating variables are likely to be
highly correlated with their product terms. To address the issue, the variables were mean
centered for all the models presented in this essay.
CEO Celebrity
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4 and 5, test the probability that a company will have CEO
celebrity contingent on the ratio of positively valued competitive actions it undertakes,
the distinctiveness of those actions, the focus of its organizational communication
materials, the CEO tenure, and the CEO founder role. To test the consistency of random
effects estimator I run the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), comparing the differences
between the coefficients estimated with the fixed effect, against the coefficients estimated
with the random effects. The results indicate that the random effect would not result in
consistent estimates and, therefore, fixed effects estimation should be used. A conditional
maximum likelihood estimation model was used to address the incidental parameter
problem (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The results using the strategic measure of
distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.11, while the results using the industry measure of
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distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.12.18 As discussed earlier, about 26% of
companies that ever had CEO celebrity always had it over the time period considered in
the panel, and 87.52% that did not have CEO celebrity never achieved it. Once again,
given the estimation model, those observations cannot be included in the analysis, leading
to a significant loss of efficiency (N= 1,424; n=116).
Model 1 reports the results when only control variables and year fixed effects are
accounted for. The greater the ratio of positive performance announcements, the greater
the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur (β=0.380, p=0.044). Following a one
standard deviation increase in the ratio of positive performance announcements the odds
of achieving celebrity increase to 1.462. Also, organizational celebrity in the previous
year has a positive effect on the likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity the following year
(β= 0.636, p=0.004). Having organizational celebrity in the previous year increases the
odds of achieving CEO the following year to 1.889. The number of awards received by a
company in a given year, and the previous level of CEO celebrity, however, do not
significantly affect the likelihood of CEO celebrity to occur.19
In hypothesis 1b, I claim that the greater is the ratio of positively valued
competitive actions the greater will be the likelihood of CEO celebrity to occur. To test
this hypothesis, in Model 2 the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to

18

Models 1 through 7 are equivalent in both tables.
It is important to note once again that, given the estimation model, the sample could not include the
observations that either never achieved or always maintained CEO celebrity during the time periods
covered by the panel. This may explain why previous CEO celebrity does not significantly affect the
likelihood of achieving celebrity the following year.
19
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the equation. The results show no significant effect, providing no support for hypothesis
1b.
In hypothesis 2b, I suggest that the relationship between positively valued
competitive actions and CEO celebrity is stronger for high levels of action
distinctiveness. Model 8 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction
term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions and strategic
distinctiveness, while Model 8 in Table 2.12 considers an interaction effect with industry
distinctiveness. In both cases, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting no
support for hypothesis 2b.
In hypothesis 3b, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when the company focuses its
communication materials at the CEO level. Model 9 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions,
strategic distinctiveness and CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not
significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 3b when strategic distinctiveness is
considered. Model 9 in Table 2.12 tests hypothesis 3b by including an interaction term
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and
CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that there is
not a 3-way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 3b.
In hypothesis 4, I claim that the combined effect of positively valued competitive
actions and action distinctiveness on CEO celebrity is stronger the shorter the tenure of
the CEO. Model 10 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term
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between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and
CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, suggesting no support for
hypothesis 4. Model 10 in Table 2.12 tests hypothesis 4 by including an interaction term
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and
CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that there is not a 3way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 4.
Interestingly, however, CEO tenure seems to have a direct positive effect on CEO
celebrity (β=0.455, p=0.002). Following a one standard deviation increase in the CEO
tenure, the odds of achieving CEO celebrity increase to 1.577.
In hypothesis 5, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness on CEO celebrity is stronger when the
CEO is also the founder of the company. Model 11 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions,
strategic distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way interaction term is not
significant, providing no support for hypothesis 5. Model 11 in Table 2.12 tests this
hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued
competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way
interaction term is significant, providing partial and preliminary support for hypothesis 5.
Moreover, the AIC fit statistic shows that the model fits the data better when compared to
the model with only control variables (AIC=965.268; Pseudo R2=0.575). Therefore,
further steps were taken to probe the nature of the interaction. First, I plotted the 3-way
interaction to identify whether the slopes follow the hypothesized pattern (Aiken et al.,
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1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). The 2-way interaction between the ratio of positive
competitive actions and industry distinctiveness is plotted in Figure 2.8 to provide a
visual baseline. Contrary to hypothesis 2b, industry distinctiveness seems not to change
the nature of the relationship between the ratio of positive competitive actions and the
likelihood of CEO celebrity (the interaction term is not significant). Things change,
however, when the CEO is also the founder of the organization. As shown in Figure 2.8,
under the leadership of a founder CEO, and with low industry distinctiveness in the
competitive choices of the organization, the relationship between ratio of positive
competitive actions and CEO celebrity seems to be more positive, providing no support
for hypothesis 5.
Given the inherent limitations of interaction plots (Dawson & Richter, 2006), I
took further steps to statistically probe the nature of this relationship. Specifically, I
conducted a subgroup analysis (Aiken et al., 1991; Peters et al., 1984), dividing the
sample on the CEO founder role variable. The effects of the ratio of positive competitive
actions and its interaction with industry distinctiveness were tested on the subsample of
observations with founder CEOs and non-founder ones separately. The results (reported
in Table 2.1320) show that the interaction term between the ratio of positive competitive
actions and industry distinctiveness is significant only for the CEO founder group.
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Given the loss of efficiency following the use of the conditional maximum likelihood estimator with
fixed effects (necessary to consistently estimate fixed effects non-linear models) previously discussed, this
further analysis was conducted with pooled-OLS estimation, adding year, industry, and company type fixed
effects and using cluster-robust standard errors.
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However, the direction of the interaction is not in the hypothesized direction, providing
no support for hypothesis 5.
Robustness Analyses
To investigate the presence of influential observations that may be driving the
results, I obtained a plot of leverage points (Pregibon, 1981). From the scatterplot, three
observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results. I run the model again
without these observations and the results remained substantially unchanged.21 To correct
for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were computed using the vce (Jackknife)
option. The lag-1 stationary autocorrelation of the residuals for company-year pairs range
from .104 to -.074, with an average of .022. This provides a rough estimate of the
interclass stationary correlation coefficient of the residuals. To test for multicollinearity,
the VIFs were investigated. For model 7 (only direct effects), all the VIFs were all below
2.27 with an average of 1.53. For model 11 (3-way interaction with industry
distinctiveness) the VIFs were all below 2.27, with an average of 1.51. These values are
well below the 10 threshold (Kutner et al., 2004) and show that multicollinearity is not a
concern. To investigate the potential for a misspecification in the model, the linktest
STATA command was used. The results indicate that the model is properly specified.
Once again, considering the significant efficiency loss caused by the conditional
maximum likelihood estimation with fixed effects, a further analysis was conducted using
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Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers are
available upon request.
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the continuous data for CEO celebrity. The analysis was conducted with fixed effects
estimation (following the results of the Hausman test), and robust standard errors. The
results for strategic distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.14, while the results for
industry distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.15. 22
In model 1 only the control variables were entered. The results show that
organizational celebrity in the previous year has a positive effect on CEO celebrity the
following year (β=0.364, p=0.001), and previous levels of CEO celebrity has a
marginally significant positive effect (β=0.239, p=0.098). Surprisingly, the number of
awards won by a company in a given year has a negative effect on CEO celebrity (β=0.269, p=.009), while the ratio of positive performance announcements does not affect
CEO celebrity. Given that counterintuitive effect of number of awards of organizational
celebrity, further steps were taken to identify the causes of this negative effect.
Specifically, the data show that of the 3245 company-year observations, 2375 did not
receive any awards. When considering only the observations with at least one award, the
average number of awards is 2.8. Also, I checked the distributions of the number of
award variable against industry condes to identify whether in certain industries awards
are more common than in others. All the observations that score higher than 14 on the
award variable are from the same industry (SIC – 73). Also, I investigated a sample of 83
award news from the RavenPack database, for the observations that scored high on the
award variable. The vast majority of the awards refer to highly specific product-service
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Models 1 through 7 are equivalent in both tables.
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awards that would be unlikely to generate the type of dramatize realities in media
coverage that foster the development of celebrity. Moreover, I run the analyses without
the companies in this industry and the number of award variable become not significant.
These findings suggest that the frequency of awards within certain industries makes them
less relevant in attracting high level of media attention.
In Model 2, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to the
equation. The results show no support for hypothesis 1b (β=0.016, p=0.397) and the AIC
statistic and R2 show that the overall model does not fit the data better than model 1.
Also, contrary to current theory on celebrity, strategic (β= -.030, p=.035) and industry
distinctiveness (β= -0.033, p=0.027) seem to have a negative effect on CEO celebrity.
To test for hypothesis 2b, model 8 in Table 2.14 considers the interaction between
the ratio of positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness, finding a significant
effect (β= -0.028, p=.022). To further probe the nature of this relationship and provide a
visual representation, I plotted the different slopes (Aiken et al., 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi,
2003). The graphs (see Figure 2.9) show that, contrary to expectations, for high strategic
distinctiveness the relationship between the ratio of positive competitive actions and CEO
celebrity is weaker. The effect is statistically significant; however, the slopes seem to
imply a low practical relevance of the effect.
Model 8 in Table 2.15 considers the interaction between the ratio of positive
competitive actions and industry distinctiveness. The interaction term is not significant,
providing no support for hypothesis 2b when industry distinctiveness is considered.
Overall, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions interacts with strategic
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distinctiveness but not with industry distinctiveness in affecting CEO celebrity. Yet, the
effect has small practical relevance and is also not in the predicted direction, providing no
support for hypotheses 2b.
In hypothesis 3b, I suggest that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when the company focuses its
communication materials at the CEO level. Model 9 in Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions,
strategic distinctiveness and CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not
significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 3b when strategic distinctiveness is
considered. Model 9 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 3b by including an interaction term
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and
CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant. Overall, therefore, I find
no support for hypothesis 3b.
In hypothesis 4, I sustain that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger for shorter tenured CEOs.
Model 10 in Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term between the
ratio of positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and CEO tenure.
The 3-way interaction term is not significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 4
when strategic distinctiveness is considered. Model 10 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 4 by
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions,
industry distinctiveness and CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant.
Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 4.
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In hypothesis 5, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger for founder CEOs. Model 11 in
Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of
positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and CEO founder role.
The 3-way interaction term is not significant, providing no support for hypothesis 5 when
strategic distinctiveness is considered. Model 11 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 5 by
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions,
industry distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way interaction term is significant
(β= -.176, p=.050). To probe the nature of this relationship, I plotted the interaction in
Figure 2.9. The effect of the ratio of positive competitive actions on CEO celebrity is
positive when the CEO is also the founder and the organization undertakes competitive
actions that are not distinctive when compared to industry norms (slope 3). On the other
hand, the effect is negative when the CEO is not the founder and the organization
undertakes competitive actions that are not distinctive when compared to industry norms
(slope 4). The slopes seem to suggest no significant relationship when founder role is
combined with high industry distinctiveness (slope 1), and when not-founder role is
combined with high industry distinctiveness (slope 2). Lastly, I also conducted a
significance test for slope differences (Dawson & Richter, 2006). The results indicate that
there is a significant difference between the slopes for high and low industry
distinctiveness (slope 2 vs. slope 4) if the CEO is not the founder. Also, the slope for low
industry distinctiveness and CEO founder (slope 3) is statistically different from the slope
for low industry distinctiveness and non-founder CEOs (slope 4). However, the slope for
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high industry distinctiveness and CEO founder (slope 1) is not statistically different from
the slope for high industry distinctiveness and not-founder CEOs (slope 2). The slope for
high industry distinctiveness under a founder CEO (slope 1) is only marginally
significantly different from the slope for low industry distinctiveness under both founder
(slope 3) and not-founder CEOs (slope 4), and the slope for high industry distinctiveness
under a not-founder CEO (slope 2) is only marginally significantly different from the
slope for low industry distinctiveness under a founder CEO (slope 3). Overall, therefore,
there seems to be a significant interaction effect between ratio of positive competitive
actions, founder role and industry distinctiveness, but not when strategic distinctiveness
is considered. However, the relationship is not in the hypothesized direction, providing
no support for hypothesis 5.
To ensure the robustness of the results for the continuous measure of CEO
celebrity, several steps were taken. First, to investigate the presence of influential
observations that may be driving the results, I obtained the Cook’s D and a leverage plot
(Cohen et al., 2003). Three observations seem to have the potential of affecting the
results. I run the model again without these observations and the results remained
substantially unchanged.23 Second, to detect heteroscedasticity, the hettest STATA
command was used and the results suggest the need to obtain robust standard errors. To
test for multicollinearity, the VIFs were investigated. For model 7 (only direct effects), all

23

Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers are
available upon request.
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the VIFs were below 2.70 with an average of 1.39. For model 11 (3-way interaction with
industry distinctiveness) the VIFs were below 2.82, with an average of 1.45. These values
are well below that 10 threshold (Cohen et al., 2003) and show that multicollinearity is
not a concern.
The findings are summarized in Table 2.16.

Discussion
Celebrity is an important social approval asset (Pfarrer et al., 2010) that can
emerge at both the individual (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational level (Rindova et
al., 2006). Defined as social actors that attract high levels of public attention and elicit
positive emotional responses (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016), celebrities achieve it through
the mediating role of the media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2016a).
Within the management field, celebrity has been studied at both the individual
and organizational level. The vast majority of empirical work has focused on
investigating the consequences of this social approval asset. Specifically, research has
empirically examined the effects of CEO and organizational celebrity on individual (see:
Graffin et al., 2013a; Kjærgaard et al., 2011; Wade et al., 2006) and organizational level
outcomes (see: Cho et al., 2016; Graffin & Ward, 2010; Love, Lim, & Bednar, 2016;
Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006). Most of the work on the antecedents of celebrity,
instead, has advanced our theoretical understanding of the construct (Hayward et al.,
2004; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a) but has lacked empirical
investigation of such theoretical claims. Moreover, research on celebrity has lacked
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investigations of the distinctive antecedents of this important social approval asset at the
individual- and organizational-level.
In this essay, I addressed these gaps in the literature and studied the antecedents
of both CEO and organizational celebrity on a sample of 244 organizations over 15 years.
This is important as previous research has showed that celebrity has important
organizational implications, and such implications are different when celebrity is at the
CEO or organizational level. In the remaining of this section, I further discuss the
theoretical contributions and practical implications of this study, as well as its limitations
and opportunities for future developments.
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications
Investigating antecedents of both organizational and CEO celebrity, this essay
provides multiple theoretical contributions and bears several practical implications. In the
remaining of this section, I first discuss the theoretical contributions and practical
implications of the findings on organizational celebrity, then I precede with the
discussion of the findings on CEO celebrity.
Organizational Celebrity
The findings in this essay support some prior theorizing about organizational
celebrity, but calls into question other key tenets of the theory, suggesting the need for
new theory.
First, the results of this essay show that the greater a company’s focus on positive
competitive actions, the more likely is the emergence of organizational celebrity.
Contrary to current theory, however, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions does
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not increase their efficacy in affecting the emergence of organizational celebrity.
Moreover, when looking at the direct effects of distinctiveness on the levels of positively
charged media coverage, both strategic and industry distinctiveness may become
counterproductive in attracting high levels of positively charged media coverage at the
organizational level. Action distinctiveness by itself is either not important or even
detrimental for the development of organizational celebrity.
These findings suggest that, contrary to current theory on celebrity the business
media are inclined to report more, and more positively, about the status quo than about
change events. Companies that diverge from their strategic history and from industry
norms are at a disadvantage when it comes to attracting high levels of positive media
coverage. This may be due to the fact that by acting highly distinctively, organizations
lose legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999). It follows that organizations may be better off
seeking strategic balance between distinctiveness and isomorphism, not only to directly
increase performance (Deephouse, 1999), but also to achieve organizational celebrity.
These findings extend theory on celebrity as they highlight how companies cannot
invite organizational celebrity by only acting in distinctive ways (Rindova et al., 2006).
Also, they suggest the need to exercise caution in using a wide brush to paint a picture of
what constitutes news, independently from the context. Research in mass communication
suggests that the media focus attention on “obtrusive events” (Rindova et al., 2006) that
depart from expectations (Lippmann, 1922); however, the business media seems to be
more inclined to report positively about organizations that do not act distinctively, at least
when competitive actions are considered. From a practical stand point, these results seem
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to suggest that salience (through distinctiveness) is less relevant than accessibility
(through volume of positive actions) in achieving organizational celebrity; through
engaging in more positively valued competitive actions, organizations become more
accessible in journalists’ minds and are more likely to achieve celebrity.
Second, the results show that things change depending upon the narrative frames
that an organization promotes in its communication to the media. These frames not only
have a direct effect on the volume and positivity of media coverage about an
organization, but also moderate the relationship between celebrity and competitive
actions. Specifically, the results show that when such communication materials are
prevalently focused at the organizational level, positive and highly distinctive
competitive actions increase both the likelihood of achieving organizational celebrity as
well as the positivity and volume of media coverage received by an organization. On the
other hand, when such communication materials are not prevalently focused at the
organizational level, regardless of the distinctiveness level of the competitive actions, the
odds of achieving organizational celebrity do not increase with competitive actions, and
the positivity and volume of media attention actually decreases.
These findings imply that “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions”
(Rindova et al., 2006: 59) is not enough to invite organizational celebrity unless an
organization provides the media with the appropriate frames to interpret those actions
(Rindova et al., 2006). In line with previous theory, therefore, I find that both competitive
actions and impression management efforts are important factors in affecting
organizational celebrity; yet the data show that more than acting independently, these two
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factors work together in fostering the development of organizational celebrity, and
distinctive competitive actions without the appropriate communication activities are not
as relevant as previously theorized. Ultimately, therefore, actions speak louder than
words only if they are interpreted the ‘right’ way; and this ‘right’ interpretation is
facilitated by organizational framing strategies. From a practical stand point, these
findings suggest that particular attention needs to be dedicated to the frames provided in
the organizational communication materials.
Third, contrary to predictions, the results on the continuous measure of
organizational celebrity show that such framing activities have the strongest impact for
low levels of distinctiveness. These results seem to suggest that the level of
distinctiveness activates different cognitive processes in the journalists’ minds.
Individuals tend to rely on either relatively automatic or controlled metal processes
contingent on their motivations and the situation (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). It is possible
that less distinctive actions activate more automatic cognitive processes in the journalists’
minds and, therefore, are interpreted relying more heavily on organizational
communication materials. On the other hand, organizational actions that are more
distinctive may activate more effortful mental processes, reducing the media reliance on
organizational communication materials and, therefore, weakening the efficacy of the
frames in those communication materials. The results seem to suggest that the salience of
distinctive actions activates journalists’ attention and by doing so, it stimulates less
passive reliance on organizational communication materials.
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Previous research shows that firms undertaking distinctive actions engage more
heavily in impression management activities and are “more concerned with managing the
interpretative frames stakeholders use to evaluate their actions” (Rindova et al., 2006:
62). Research in mass communication shows that these information subsides are used by
journalists as they save time and reduce the costs associated with producing a news story
(Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001; Rindova et al., 2006; Tuchman, 1978). Yet, the results of
this essay show that such impression management activities are less effective when
organizations undertake highly distinctive actions. This contributes to corporate and mass
communication theory suggesting that the obtrusiveness of the events to be reported
reduces the tendency of journalists to reinforce familiar explanations by gathering few
accounts of additional supporting evidence, rather than actively seeking disconfirming
ones (Hayward et al., 2004), affecting the overall efficacy of organizational
communication materials. From a practical stand point, these results show that to attain
more and more favorable media coverage at the organizational level, organizations
should not underestimate the importance of impression management efforts especially
when they are not undertaking highly distinctive actions.
CEO celebrity
This essay represents a first attempt to empirically test theoretical claims about
CEO celebrity and the formation of the media attributions affecting the development of
this important social approval asset.
First, in line with current theory on CEO celebrity, the results of this essay show
that it is positively related to positive performance announcements and previous levels of
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organizational celebrity. Also, the data show that the frames provided in the
organizational communication materials to the media have a strong direct effect on CEO
celebrity. However, competitive actions, independently from their level of
distinctiveness, do not foster the likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity. These findings
contribute to theory on CEO celebrity as they show that while competitive actions and
their distinctiveness are not particularly important for the development of celebrity at the
individual level, the availability of information about the CEO in the organizational
communication materials is a strong predictor of CEO celebrity. These results imply that
to invite CEO celebrity, organizations are better off focusing on framing activities of their
communication materials.
Second, the results also suggest that longer tenured CEOs have a greater
likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity. Research shows that “long-tenured CEOs often
accumulate much power and legitimacy. There are two possible explanations for these
findings. First, long-tenured CEOs develop the freedom to centralize strategy making and
the confidence to make key decisions unilaterally” (Miller, 1993: 645),as they are less
concerned with building consensus behind their strategic plan and less dependent on
other administrators to obtain support and information (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).
The results of this essay suggest that this increase in power and legitimacy fosters the
development of larger-than-human expectations among journalists as they develop their
narratives, increasing the likelihood of CEO celebrity to emerge. Second, tenure itself can
be interpreted as a sign of correctness and success, as CEOs are generally allowed to keep
their positions as long as their performance is acceptable (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).
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These increased perceptions of success seem to affect media coverage in such a way that
the longer the tenure of the CEO the greater the likelihood of CEO celebrity. These
findings advance current theory on individual celebrity as they suggest that not only
behavioral elements, but also intrinsic characteristics of the CEO foster the achievement
of celebrity at the individual level. From a practical standpoint, this research shows that
organizations under the leadership of a long tenured CEO may need to place particular
attention on the framing of their communications materials.
Third, the results show that competitive actions are not relevant in determining
CEO celebrity, and the distinctiveness of those actions not only does not increase the
odds of achieving CEO celebrity, but also is negatively related to the volume and
positivity of media coverage about the CEO. Also, this effect is not moderated by the
tenure of the CEO, providing no support for the idea that when a company acts
distinctively in temporal proximity with the appointment of a new CEO, attributions at
the individual-level are more likely to emerge in media narratives (Hayward et al., 2004).
Overall, the media seem to adopt the frames provided in the organizational
communication materials and information about the CEO tenure, without triangulating
this information with facts about an organization’s competitive actions and their
distinctiveness.
Lastly, the findings show that when the CEO is also the founder, this impacts the
effectiveness of distinctive competitive actions to foster CEO celebrity. Specifically,
contrary to predictions, the findings show that CEO celebrity is more likely to emerge
when the organization undertakes more positive competitive actions that are not highly
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distinctive from industry norms under the leadership of a founder-CEO. These results
show that the greater the accessibility of an individual attributional frame – made
possible by the presence of a founder CEO – the greater is the likelihood of CEO
celebrity to emerge only if the organization undertakes more positive actions that are not
highly distinctive from industry norms. These findings seem to suggest that when highly
distinctive actions are undertaken, journalists may engage in more active cognitive
processes and seek to acquire more evidence about attributional claims to incorporate in
their reporting. On the other hand, when the organization undertakes low distinctive
actions, journalists are more likely to engage in automatic cognitive processing and more
readily adopt the more available individual level frame. Once again, these findings call
into questions some key tenets of CEO celebrity theory while suggesting important new
extensions. Specifically, the results suggest that competitive actions and their
characteristics have a marginal role in determining CEO celebrity, while individual level
characteristics, specifically CEO tenure and founder status, play an important role in
fostering the development of this social approval asset.
Summary
To summarize, this essay advance current theory on celebrity by empirically
investigating whether “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions” (Rindova
et al., 2006: 59) affects the likelihood of achieving this important social approval asset at
both the individual and organizational level. Second, this essay advances current theory
on celebrity by identifying individual level characteristics that beyond behavioral factors,
may affect the emergence of CEO celebrity. Third, this essay contributes to theory on
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celebrity by highlighting how distinctiveness may reduce the adoption by journalists of
attributional frames that are made readily available by impression management activities
or by CEO’s characteristics. Lastly, this essay advance research on media within
organizational studies. Research in mass communication suggests that the media focus
attention on obtrusive events (Rindova et al., 2006). In contrast, the results of this study
suggest that the business media seems to be more inclined to report positively about
organizations that do not act highly distinctively, at least when competitive actions are
considered.
Methodological Contributions
This essay also provides multiple methodological contributions. Research on
social approval assets such as status, legitimacy, reputation, and celebrity, has flourished
within the field of organizational studies. While intense theoretical efforts have highlight
different theoretical underpinnings, socio-cognitive foundations, as well as different
development processes for these different intangible resources (Rindova et al., 2006;
Zavyalova et al., 2016a), empirical studies are characterized by a certain degree of
ambiguity in the operationalization of these different constructs. Often times the same
measure (e.g. CEO certification / awards contest) is used to operationalize different social
approval assets – e.g. celebrity (Cho et al., 2016), status (Graffin et al., 2008), reputation
(Boivie, Graffin, & Gentry, 2016). Such tendencies, ultimately, may humper not only our
understanding of how these diverse social approval assets differently affect
organizational processes and outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2010), but also our ability to
identify the idiosyncratic characteristics of their development processes. Building on the
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role of media as the distinctive characteristic of celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006) and on
established standards in the study of organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010), I used
a complementary measure of CEO celebrity. Furthermore, the use of distinctive and
complementary measures for the operationalization of CEO and organizational celebrity
will facilitate future research on the construct at multiple levels.
Second, the data show little mobility of celebrity, with about half of the
observations never achieved or always had celebrity over the time considered by the
panel. This is in line with an investigation on the mobility of fame by van de Rijt and
colleagues (Van de Rijt et al., 2013). Using daily data about the references of persons’
names in a large corpus of media sources, they found that celebrity exhibits strong
continuity and, once established, it seems to persist over time, being less ephemeral than
originally thought (Van de Rijt et al., 2013). Under these circumstances, the estimation
model needed for the dichotomous operationalization of celebrity, causes a significant
loss of efficiency, suggesting that in these situations a continuous operationalization may
be preferred. Also, by preserving the variance in media coverage, the continuous measure
may allow for a more fine-grained understanding of the dynamics leading to celebrity at
the individual or organizational level.
Limitations and Future Developments
Some of the limitations of this essay also provide opportunities for future
research. First, in this essay I investigate the effect of competitive actions on the
development of celebrity at the individual and organizational levels. Although this
approach has the advantage of exploring how a diverse set of organizational events
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affects the development of this important social approval asset, other organizational
events may be equally important in fostering its development. Specifically, new theory on
celebrity suggests that it develops as “information about elements that are salient and
socially significant” are made available to the media (Zavyalova et al., 2016a: 4). By
measuring the distinctiveness in competitive actions, I investigated how ‘salient’ actions
affect the development of celebrity. However, competitive actions may not be as ‘socially
significant’ as other organizational initiatives, such as stands on political or social issues.
Such types of actions are also likely to draw media attention to an organization and its
leadership. Future research may be needed to understand how other types of actions,
beyond competitive ones, affect the development of individual or organizational
celebrity.
Second, research on deviance has argued that regardless of the objective
characteristics of the behavior (being overconforming – i.e. behaviors that objectively
positively deviate from the norm – or underconforming – i.e. behaviors that objectively
negatively deviate from the norm) the social evaluations of the behavior (positive or
negative) is also important in determining deviance (Rindova et al., 2006). Following
these considerations, I focused on positively evaluated competitive actions (as measured
by the RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score). Nevertheless, I did not distinguish between
overconforming and underconforming behaviors (Rindova et al., 2006). It is possible
that positively evaluated underconforming behaviors – i.e. deviance admiration (Rindova
et al., 2006) – act differently than positively evaluated overconforming behaviors – i.e.
positive deviance – in attracting the positive media attention needed to develop CEO
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and organizational celebrity. Therefore, future research is needed to investigate if and
how different types of deviance affect the development of celebrity.
Lastly, the use of archival data, although relatively common in the study of
celebrity, does not allow for direct investigation of how journalists develop attributions.
Rather, it focuses on the outcome of this process. Future studies may further develop our
understanding of how organizational and CEO celebrity develop by employing
experimental approaches or through direct observations and other qualitative methods.
This would allow a more direct test of the process through which journalists develop
causal attributions and how such frames are incorporated in their reporting.

Conclusion
Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational
celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973) and framing
theory (Entman, 1993), this essay investigates factors that affect the likelihood of CEO
and organizational celebrity to emerge. The findings show that, contrary to current
theory, the distinctiveness of competitive actions does not facilitate the development of
celebrity at either level, unless other information is made available to journalists
increasing the availability of specific attributional frames. Overall, the findings suggest
that further empirical research on the antecedents of celebrity at the organizational and
individual level is very much needed to test and advance the theoretical claims on these
important social approval assets.
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Appendix 2

a

Individual-level articles are in italics; organizational-level articles are underlined.
* indicates seminal piece.
c
Articles were identified by a search on Google Scholar for articles containing the expressions “CEO
celebrity” “organizational celebrity” and “celebrity firms”, and published in the Academy of Management
Journal, the Academy of Management Review, the Strategic Management Journal, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Organization Science, and the Journal of Management. Also, the search was conducted without
search terms among articles in these publications citing Hayward et al. 2004 and/or Rindova et al. 2006.
The articles were selected for inclusion when explicitly labeling one of their variables with the term
celebrity (regardless of the measurement used), or when using media coverage data to asses a social
approval asset.
b

Figure 2.1. Review of literature on Organizational and CEO celebrity. a, b, c
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual model: Organizational celebrity

Figure 2.3. Conceptual model: CEO celebrity.
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Table 2.1. Sample.

Fortune Unicorns
500
List
91
48
43

Total
High Media Visibility
SIC: 20; 27; 28; 35
Average Media Visibility
SIC: 48; 49; 73; 23
Low Media Visibility
SIC: 26; 36; 50; 51; 55
Total

61

56

5

92

54

38

244

158

86

SIC: 20 - Food & Kindred Products
SIC: 23 - Apparel & Other Textile Products
SIC: 26 - Paper & Allied Products
SIC: 27 - Printing & Publishing
SIC: 28 - Chemical & Allied Products
SIC: 35 - Industrial Machinery & Equipment
SIC: 36 - Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
SIC: 48 - Communications
SIC: 49 - Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services
SIC: 50 - Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
SIC: 51 - Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods
SIC: 55 - Automotive Dealers & Service Stations
SIC: 73 - Business Services
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Table 2.2. Types of competitive actions and headlines examples.
Action Category
Acquisition

Strategic Alliances

Capacity

New Product

Marketing

Market Entry

Price

Legal

RavenPack Classification

Company

Headline

Acquisition Completed Acquirer

Calpine Corp.

Calpine Closes On Acquisition Of Champion
Energy >CPN

Unit-acquisition Acquirer

Microsoft Corp.

Microsoft buys VoloMetrix to boost data
analytics in Office 365

Acquisition Completed Acquirer

Corning Inc.

Corning Completes Acquisition of iBwave
Software Design Company

Partnership

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.

Neo Solar Power and DuPont Signed
Technology Cooperation Agreement

Partnership

Airbnb Inc.

NRG Home Solar Partners With Airbnb To
Boost Rooftop Solar

Partnership Terminated

eBay Inc.

PayPal ends business relationship with Mega

Facility Open

IBM Corp.

IBM Opens New Cloud Center in Quebec

Facility Close

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer To Shut Cambridge Site: 120 Jobs May
Go

Facility Upgrade

PPG Industries Inc.

PPG Industries Completes Expansion of
Facility in Brazil - Analyst Blog

Product Release

MuleSoft Inc.

MuleSoft Expands API-Led Connectivity With
Major New Release of Anypoint Platform

Product Release

Dean Foods Co.

Dean Foods unveils DairyPure milk

Product Release

Texas Instruments Inc.

TI unveils new informational advanced driver
assistance systems SDK

Campaign Ad Release

Intel Corp.

Intel Unveils First Commercial 14 Nanometer
Processor

Campaign Ad Release

PepsiCo Inc.

Pepsi launch 2015 Nations Cup campaign
ahead of event kick-off

Campaign Ad Retired

Coca-Cola Co.

Coca-Cola ends automated Twitter campaign
after it tweets parts of Mein Kampf read
comments

Investment

Qualcomm Inc.

Audi and Qualcomm invest €18m in Irish startup Cubic Telecom

Investment

Google Inc.

Google Invested $900 Million in SpaceX

Investment

Motorola Solutions Inc.

Motorola Solutions Invests in Drone Maker
CyPhy Works

Product Price Cut

Uber Inc.

Uber cuts fares by up to 40% in India

Product Price Cut

Oracle Corp.

Oracle Slashes Prices on New Servers Starting
Price War

Product Price Raise

Air Products & Chemicals Inc.

Air Products (APD) to Hike Prices of Products
& Services - Analyst Blog

Patent Infringment Plaintiff

3M Co.

3M Files Patent Suit Vs Dental Direkt GmbH

Legal Issues Plaintiff

Procter & Gamble Co.

Gillette sues Dollar Shave Club over blades

Legal Issues Plaintiff

Eastman Chemical Co.

Rayonier and Eastman sue each other over
specialty cellulose supply and purchase
agreement
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Table 2.3. Awards and Ratio of Positive Performance control variables with
headlines examples.
Control
Awards

RavenPack Classification
Products Services Award

Company
Bemis Co. Inc.

Headline
Bemis Receives Gold and Silver Achievement
Awards from the Flexible Packaging Association

Products Services Award

Yahoo! Inc.

Yahoo Wins Data Center Energy Efficiency
Award Utilizing Cooling Optimization and
Control Solution from SynapSense, a Panduit
Company

Products Services Award

3M Co.

3M Named as a World's Most Ethical Company
for Second Consecutive Year

Exelon Corp.

Exelon's 3Q15 Revenue Beat Consensus
Estimates

Earnings Up

Dean Foods Co.

MW Dean Foods swings to profit, beats
expectations

Earnings Below Expectations

CenterPoint Energy Inc.

(CNP) CENTERPOINT EGY Q2 Revenue
$1.532B, -15.0% Surprise

Earnings Down

PepsiCo Inc.

MW PepsiCo. Q3 net income slumps 73% to
$533 million

Earnings Up

R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. R.R. Donnelley Turns To Profit In Q1; Backs
2015 Net Sales Outlook - Quick Facts

Ratio of Positive
Revenue Above Expectations
Competitive Actions
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Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics and correlation.
Mean
Overall

SD
Between

Within

Min

Max

1

1 CEO Celebrity (dichotomous)

0.135

0.342

0.221

0.262

0

1

1.000

2 Organizational Celebrity (dichotomous)

0.162

0.3682

0.252

0.260

0

1

0.395

3 CEO Celebrity (continous)

0.017

2.027

1.352

1.389

-0.772

40.201

0.551

4 Organizational Celebrity (continous)
5 CEO Celebrity (dichotomous) t-1
6 Organizational Celebrity (dichotomous) t-1
7 Industry Visibility
8 Firm Type (F500)
9 Awards
10 Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.019
0.129
0.156
1.991
0.785

2.054
0.335
0.363
0.844
0.411

1.451
0.207
0.241
0.868
0.479

1.298
0.253
0.257
0
0

-0.439
0
0
1
0

35.697
1
1
3
1

0.350
0.430
0.410
0.118
0.058

0.813

1.959

1.261

1.421

0

23

0.220

0.579

0.377

0.368

0.19

0

1

0.081

11 Tenure

5.458

5.604

3.683

4.028

0

38

0.077

12 Founder Role

0.214

0.410

0.453

0.137

0

1

-0.002

13 Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

0.540

0.401

0.342

0.248

0

1

0.155

14 Strategic Distinctiveness

0.270

0.410

0.237

0.333

0

2

-0.128

1.5

-0.190

996

0.416

41

0.127

15 Industry Distinctiveness
16 Organizational-focused PR
17 CEO-focused PR

0.271
32.516
3.657

0.242
76.349
5.995

0.145
63.494
4.257

0.189
33.158
4.017

0
0
0

2

***

3

0.378 ***

1.000

***

0.397 ***

0.756

***

***

***
**
***
***
***

0.410
0.507
0.159
0.146
0.243

***
***

***
***
***
***

0.152 ***
0.010
-0.103

***

5

6

7

1.000

***

***

4

0.236
-0.133
-0.259

0.409
0.376
0.047
0.093
0.255
0.105
0.114

***
***
***
***

-0.036
0.155
-0.099
-0.175

***

0.442 ***

0.600

***

0.082 ***

0.111

***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***

1.000
0.354
0.360

***
***

0.022
0.096
0.271
0.111

0.148
-0.089
-0.166
0.693
0.115

0.416
0.109

***
***
***

-0.001
-0.071

1.000

0.104
0.250
0.110
0.063

***
***
***
***
***
***

-0.045
0.196
-0.119
-0.216
0.421
0.132

***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***

1.000
0.152
0.167
0.269
0.155

***
***
***
***

0.002
-0.124
0.238
-0.127
-0.240
0.447
0.078

1.000
-0.070

***

-0.028
-0.051

**

-0.014
***
***
***
***
***
***

0.054

***

0.011
-0.070
-0.167
-0.012
-0.000

***
***
***
***

N=2,999 ; n=244
a

*** p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10
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Table 2.4. (Continued).
8 Firm Type (F500)

8
1.000

9 Awards

0.213

10 Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements
11 Tenure
12 Founder Role
13 Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions
14 Strategic Distinctiveness
15 Industry Distinctiveness
16 Organizational-focused PR
17 CEO-focused PR

0.800
0.075
-0.846
0.627
0.289
-0.138
0.212
0.273

9
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1.000
0.192
0.069
-0.171
0.284
-0.150
-0.254
0.487
0.151

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1.000
0.086
-0.676
0.594
0.261
-0.114
0.192
0.245

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1.000
0.118
0.047
0.034
0.004
0.021
-0.027

***
**
†

1.000
-0.539
-0.243
0.110
-0.146
-0.258

***

1.000

***

0.164 ***

***

***

***
***

-0.290
0.275
0.227

***
***

1.000
0.438

***

1.000

0.124

***

0.267

***

1.000

0.065

***

0.089

***

0.312

***

N=2,999 ; n=244
a

*** p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10
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Table 2.5. Within and Between Summaries.

Organizational No
Celebrity
Yes

CEO
Celebrity

Overall
Frequency
Percent
2737
84.35%

Between
Frequency
Percent
239
97.95%

Within
Percent
87.44%

508

15.65%

117

47.95%

29.92%

Total

3245

100.00%

356

145.90%

68.54%

No
Yes
Total

2825
420
3245

87.06%
12.94%
100.00%

243
119
362

99.59%
48.77%
148.36%

87.52%
26.33%
67.40%

Table 2.6. Transition Probabilities.

No
Yes

Organizational
Celebrity
No
Yes
2327
206
91.87%
8.13%
189
40.39%

279
59.62

CEO
Celebrity
No
Yes
2408
206
92.12%
7.88%
187
48.32

200
51.68%
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Table 2.7. Fixed effects logit results predicting Organizational Celebrity. a, b, c, d, e
Model 1
Awards
Ratio of Positive Announcements

Model 2

Founder Role
CEO celebrity (t-1)

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

-0.149

-0.151

-0.154

-0.154

-0.165

-0.165

-0.162

-0.168

-0.140

(0.127)

(0.126)

(0.228)

(0.126)

(0.127)

(0.127)

(0.129)

(0.128)

0.545

***

0.518

***

(0.153)

0.515

***

(0.152)

0.503

***

-0.152

0.501

**

(0.155)

0.508

**

(0.156)

0.505

***

(0.154)

0.511

**

(0.163)

0.498

0.167

0.165

0.168

0.168

0.171

0.176

0.170

0.171

0.173

(0.138)

(0.139)

(0.140)

(0.139)

(0.140)

(0.140)

(0.139)

(0.142)

-0.802

-0.799

-0.813

-0.856

-0.927

-0.956

-0.936

-1.073

-1.010

(0.721)

(0.720)

(0.711)

-0.703

(0.695)

(0.699)

(0.699)

(0.709)

(0.738)

0.438

†

0.439

†

(0.227)

0.438

†

(0.228)

0.434

†

-0.228

0.417

†

(0.233)

0.409

†

(0.232)

0.419

†

(0.234)

0.404

†

(0.237)

0.400

0.108

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.077

0.100

0.085

0.053

0.050

(0.148)

(0.148)

(0.148)

(0.147)

(0.149)

(0.149)

(0.153)

(0.152)

0.247

*

(0.124)

0.293

*

(0.131)

Strategic Distinctiveness

0.273

*

(0.137)

0.264

†

(0.138)

0.245

†

(0.143)

0.243

†

(0.139)

0.223

0.195

(0.167)

(0.154)

-0.182

-0.113

-0.114

-0.193

-0.125

-0.577

(0.124)

(0.138)

(0.139)

(0.193)

(0.143)

(0.229)

Industry Distinctiveness

*

-0.133
(0.147)

-0.184

-0.173

-0.184

-0.229

-0.199

-0.346

(0.140)

(0.139)

(0.145)

(0.181)

(0.139)

(0.173)

Organizational-focused PR

0.303

0.305

0.305

0.062

-0.003

(0.202)

(0.201)

(0.200)

(0.388)

(0.389)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness

0.150

0.465

(0.172)

(0.234)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness

0.129

0.155
(0.163)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Organizational-focused PR

-0.057

-0.342

(0.395)

(0.365)

Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

(0.562)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

(0.599)

1.212

**

*

Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

-0.791

†

-0.417

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

F
LR
AIC
Pseudo-R2

*

*

-0.169

-1.654

†

(0.236)

(0.146)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

**

(0.157)

(0.137)

(0.230)

Organizational celebrity (t-1)

Model 4

(0.126)

(0.152)

Tenure

Model 3

0.118
(0.421)

2.25
41.711
1012.420
0.316

**
**

2.20
45.059
1011.073
0.336

**
***

2.20
47.563
1010.568
0.351

**
***

2.07
49.688
1010.444
0.363

**
***

2.26
52.288
1009.843
0.378

**
***

2.13
53.534
1010.598
0.385

**
***

2.20
53.262
1010.869
0.384

**
***

2.33
62.916
1007.216
0.436

**
***

2.13
58.642
1010.507
0.413

**
***

N=1469; n=110
a ***
b

p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10

Jackknife Standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

e

Two outliers were excluded from the analysis.
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a

Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.7 (Model 8).

Figure 2.4. Fixed effects logit slopes predicting Organizational Celebrity. a
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Table 2.8. Subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity
(2 subgroups). a, b, c, d, e

Awards

High
Organizationalfocused PR
N=941
n=77

Low
Organizationalfocused PR
N=344
n=45

-0.066

-0.381

(0.133)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.429

(0.188)
*

(0.186)

Tenure
Founder Role

0.137

0.423

(0.144)

(0.216)

-1.144

-0.512

(0.876)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

0.521

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)
Industry Distinctiveness
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions
Strategic Distinctiveness

(1.394)
*

(0.474)

-0.024

-0.191

(0.206)

(0.416)

-0.197

-0.381

(0.160)

(0.281)

0.107

0.272

(0.203)

(0.295)
**

(0.294)

0.676
(0.276)

a ***

p<=.001;

**

*

0.158

(0.240)

-0.826

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness

0.873
(0.454)

0.122
(0.289)

*

-0.252
(0.226)

†

p<=.01; p<=.05; p<.10

b

Standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Two outliers were excluded from the analysis.

e

Fixed effect estimation.
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Figure 2.5. Slopes of subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity (2 subgroups). a
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Table 2.9. Subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity (4 subgroups). a, b, c, d
High Strategic
Distinctiveness

Firm Type (F500)

Low Strategic
Distinctiveness

N=823
n=160

N=2,174
n=243

0.176

0.806

High Strategic Distinctiveness

Low Strategic Distinctiveness

High
Low
Organizational- Organizationalfocused PR
focused PR
N=369
N=235
n=106
n=91

High
Low
Organizational- Organizationalfocused PR
focused PR
N=1,129
N=1,045
n=155
n=195

n.a.

0.165

0.764

0.928

2.750

1.265

2.790

2.400

***

2.764

**

0.938

3.796

***

2.004

†

8.344 ***

6.086

***

9.015

***

*

0.913

Industry Visibility
Medium

2.501

†

1.140

High

4.561

**

2.605

***

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

3.210

*

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)

3.458

**

2.635
5.032

*

3.671

***

4.084

*

5.223

***

2.398

Awards

0.750

0.930

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.941

1.459

Tenure

0.804

Founder Role

0.525

0.883

n.a.

1.170

1.230

0.664

1.248

1.631

0.989

0.751

1.009

1.033

0.989

0.892

n.a.

0.811

1.135

**

Industry Distinctiveness

0.967

0.445

***

Organizational-focused PR

1.748

2.266

***

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions
a

1.990

**

0.560

0.899

1.055
3.384

***

0.764
***

0.760

0.201

0.574

-

-

-

1.222

0.915

0.941

*

*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<.05

b

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

c

Odds ratios calculated on logistic regression coefficients from pooled OLS estimation models on median-split samples and cluster-robust VCE.

d

Two outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2.10. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of Organizational
Celebrity. a, b, c, d
Model 1
Awards

-0.258

Model 2
*

(0.118)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.093

Founder Role
CEO Celebrity (t-1)
Organizatioanl Celebrity (t-1)

Model 3
*

(0.119)
*

(0.045)

Tenure

-0.258
0.089

-0.259

Model 4
*

(0.119)
†

(0.046)

0.086

-0.259

Model 5
*

(0.119)
†

(0.045)

0.086

-0.247

Model 6
*

(0.121)
†

(0.045)

0.075

-0.247

Model 7
*

(0.121)
†

(0.042)

0.074

-0.247

Model 8
*

(0.121)
†

(0.042)

0.073

-0.229

Model 9
*

(0.099)
†

(0.041)

0.088

†

(0.047)

0.015

0.016

0.016

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.021

0.021

(0.017)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.016)

(0.015)

-0.025

-0.247

-0.255

-0.257

-0.363

-0.360

-0.364

-0.340

-0.301

(0.214)

(0.213)

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.254)

(0.253)

(0.253)

(0.234)

(0.226)

-0.047

-0.047

-0.047

-0.047

0.056

-0.056

0.056

-0.054

-0.059

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.060)

***

0.686

***

(0.067)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

0.033

0.685

***

(0.067)
*

(0.147)

0.040
-0.035

0.685

***

(0.067)
*

(0.017)

Strategic Distinctiveness

0.037

*

-0.027

*

*

(0.013)

Industry Distinctiveness

-0.024

0.622

***

(0.062)

(0.016)

(0.014)

*

***

0.622

***

(0.062)

0.607
(0.055)

*

0.036

0.038

0.188

(0.022)

(0.024)

(0.083)

(0.057)

0.048

-0.018

(0.045)

(0.012)

†

-0.018
0.449

-0.019

†

(0.011)
†

-0.017

***

0.448

†

†

-0.016

†

(0.009)
***

(0.137)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness

-0.020
(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.137)

0.447

***

(0.137)

0.043

(0.010)

(0.037)

-0.177

-0.316

-0.078

(0.011)

0.127

-0.016

(0.222)

-0.015

***

*

(0.267)
*

(0.037)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness

-0.019

-0.153

(0.014)

(0.067)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Organizational-focused PR

(0.280)

Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

(0.194)

0.691

*

0.498

*

*

(0.195)

0.207

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

-0.280

*

(0.112)

Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

0.154
(0.136)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR

-0.575

**

(0.222)

367.660

R2

0.599
(0.052)

0.027
-0.022

†

(0.060)
***

(0.016)

(0.010)

Organizational-focused PR

0.622
(0.061)

(0.012)

(0.010)

AIC

0.090
(0.047)

0.015

0.686

*

(0.090)

(0.0170

(0.067)

F

-0.217

***

351.050

***

329.630

***

319.320

***

349.690

***

338.640

***

351.760

***

464.070

***

371.700

7108.379

7108.599

7107.014

7107.577

6954.425

6955.621

6955.235

6811.948

6748.567

0.748

0.748

0.750

0.751

0.778

0.777

0.777

0.796

0.798

***

N=2997; n=244
a ***
b

p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

e

Two outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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a

Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.10 (Model 8).

Figure 2.6. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of Organizational Celebrity – Strategic Distinctiveness. a
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a

Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.10 (Model 9).

Figure 2.7. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of Organizational Celebrity – Industry Distinctiveness. a
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Table 2.11. Fixed effects logit results predicting CEO Celebrity – Strategic
Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e
Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

-0.076

-0.075

-0.075

-0.076

-0.106

-0.088

-0.104

-0.106

-0.107

-0.075

-0.108

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.114)

(.113)

(0.112)

(0.096)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.380

(0.096)
*

(0.186)

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)

0.636

(0.191)
**

(0.218)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

0.381

(0.096)
*

0.636

0.371

(0.097)
†

(0.190)
**

(0.219)

0.621

0.374

(0.097)
†

(0.190)
**

(0.224)

0.621

0.343

(0.098)
†

(0.188)
**

(0.221)

0.337

†

(0.193)

0.663 **
(0.224)

0.654

**

0.329

0.325

0.341

(0.198)

-0.199

(0.202)

0.677

**

0.648 **

0.642

†

0.309

0.302

(0.203)
**

0.574

(0.199)
*

0.610 *

(0.225)

(0.237)

(0.239)

(0.241)

(0.247)

(0.243)

0.055

0.055

0.061

0.061

0.015

0.020

-0.025

-0.015

-0.009

-0.091

-0.027

(0.180)

(0.180)

(0.179)

(0.180)

(0.174)

(0.174)

(0.172)

(0.173)

(0.177)

(0.180)

(0.171)

-0.010

0.045

0.051

0.024

0.014

-0.003

0.038

0.022

0.034

(0.152)

(0.159)

(0.159)

(0.166)

(0.184)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions
Strategic Distinctiveness

-0.238

(0.159)
†

(0.121)

-0.256

(0.157)
*

(0.126)

Industry Distinctiveness

-0.254

(0.158)
*

(0.126)

0.044

0.051

0.131

(0.130)

Tenure

0.455

-0.251

(0.159)
†

(0.127)

(0.134)

0.044

0.061

(0.132)
**

(0.141)

0.549
-1.575

0.545

†

-1.588
0.334

-0.204

(0.151)

(0.176)

0.051

0.537

†

-1.575

†

(0.119)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness

0.334

-1.581

0.671

†

-1.597

-0.278
0.033
(0.140)

**

0.527 **
(0.156)

†

(0.929)

-2.178

*

(-1.086)
**

0.252

0.332

(0.119)

(0.187)

(0.120)

(0.118)

-0.182

-0.155

-0.245

-0.037

(0.116)

(0.134)

(0.148)

(0.134)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
CEO-focused PR

†

(0.159)

(0.211)

(0.927)
**

(0.185)

(0.147)
***

(0.154)

(0.896)
**

0.536

-0.084
*

0.024

(0.128)
***

(0.153)

(0.919)

CEO-focused PR

-0.201

(0.142)
(0.131)
***

(0.153)

(0.900)

-0.223
0.053

(0.135)
***

(0.157)

Founder Role

-0.275

*

0.335

**

0.055
(0.179)

Strategic Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

-0.167
(0.218)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

-0.101
(0.207)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Tenure

-0.385

Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure

-0.298

(0.334)

(0.332)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure

0.313
(0.300)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Founder Role

0.623
(0.453)

Strategic Distinctivenesse X
Founder Role

-0.489

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Founder Role

-0.907

(0.517)

(0.557)

2.94

***

2.83

***

LR

55.042

***

55.046

***

AIC

987.580

991.575

990.098

991.984

975.652

974.293

964.159

0.378

0.378

0.396

0.397

0.485

0.500

0.549

F

Pseudo-R2

3.07 ***

2.94

***

***

58.638

***

58.524

3.57 ***

3.58

***

3.32

***

***

80.329

***

92.462

***

76.970

3.30 ***

3.14

3.04

***

***

96.942

112.585

***

964.499

967.679

952.037

965.045

0.556

0.556

0.621

0.576

94.122

***

3.24 ***
99.577

***

N=1421; n=116
a ***
b

p<=.001;

**

*

†

p<=.01; p<=.05; p<.10

Jackknife standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

e

Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2.12. Fixed effects logit results predicting CEO Celebrity – Industry
Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e
Awards
Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

-0.076

-0.075

-0.075

-0.076

-0.106

-0.088

-0.104

-0.105

-0.100

-0.075

-0.103

(0.096)

(0.096)

(0.096)

(0.097)

(0.097)

(0.098)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.113)

(0.112)

0.329

0.328

0.342

0.380

*

(0.186)

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)

0.636

*

(0.191)
**

(0.218)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

0.381
0.636

0.371

†

(0.190)
**

(0.219)

0.621

0.374

†

(0.190)
**

(0.224)

0.621

0.343

†

(0.188)
**

(0.221)

0.663

0.337

†

(0.193)
**

(0.224)

0.654

(0.198)
**

0.677

(0.199)
**

0.676

†

(0.205)
**

0.673

0.303

0.314

(0.204)
*

0.619

(0.198)
*

0.635

(0.225)

(0.237)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.249)

(0.239)

0.055

0.055

0.061

0.061

0.015

0.02

-0.025

-0.024

-0.015

-0.082

-0.035

(0.180)

(0.180)

(0.179)

(0.180)

(0.174)

(0.174)

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.175)

(0.177)

(0.170)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

-0.010

0.045

0.051

0.024

0.014

-0.003

0.002

0.002

0.029

(0.152)

(0.159)

(0.159)

(0.157)

(0.158)

(0.159)

(0.165)

(0.170)

(0.182)

Strategic Distinctiveness

-0.238

†

(0.121)

-0.256

*

(0.126)

Industry Distinctiveness

-0.254

*

(0.126)

0.044

0.051

0.131

(0.130)

Tenure

0.455

-0.251

†

(0.127)

0.044

(0.141)

0.549

0.061

-1.575

0.545

(0.900)

-1.588
0.334

0.545
-1.586

**

0.334

-1.620

(0.187)

†

0.726

-0.338
0.036
(0.174)

***

0.534

(0.199)

(0.156)

-1.509

-2.337

(1.010)

(1.027)

0.239

0.320

(0.188)

(0.120)

**

0.337

0.045

0.018

0.163

(0.127)

(0.140)

(0.139)

(0.158)

**

0.056

-0.173
(0.158)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

0.089
(0.193)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Tenure

-0.450
(0.315)

Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure

0.015
(0.103)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure

-0.003
(0.187)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Founder Role

0.422
(0.333)

Industry Distinctivenesse X
Founder Role

-0.387
(0.380)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Founder Role

-0.712

*

(0.322)

2.94

***

2.83

***

3.07

***

2.94

***

LR

55.042

***

55.046

***

58.524

***

58.638

***

AIC

987.580

991.575

990.098

991.984

975.652

974.293

964.159

966.135

970.631

959.972

965.268

0.378

0.378

0.396

0.397

0.485

0.500

0.549

92.487

0.555

0.594

0.575

Pseudo-R2

*

(0.166)

Industry Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

F

***

(0.120)

-0.019

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
CEO-focused PR

*

(0.146)

0.047

(0.919)
**

-0.130
*

(0.167)
***

(0.152)
†

(0.119)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness

0.546

-0.356
(0.165)

0.030

(0.925)

(0.119)

*

(0.150)
***

(0.153)
†

-0.276
(0.135)

0.064

(0.919)

CEO-focused PR

*

(0.146)
***

(0.153)
†

-0.274
(0.136)

(0.135)
***

(0.157)

Founder Role

*

(0.134)

(0.132)
**

-0.275

**

3.57 ***

3.58

***

3.32

***

3.21

***

3.18

***

2.77

***

3.23

***

***

80.329

***

92.462

***

92.487

***

93.991

***

104.649

***

99.353

***

76.970

N=1421; n=116
a ***
b

p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10

Jackknife standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

e

Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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a

Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.12 (Model 11).

Figure 2.8. Fixed effects slopes predicting CEO Celebrity. a
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Table 2.13. Subgroup analysis on founder-split samples for CEO celebrity. a, b, c, d, e

Firm Type (F500)

Founder
N=642
n=99

Not Founder
N=2,354
n=170

0.377

-0.584

(1.232)

(0.938)

0.269

0.524

(0.615)

(0.257)

Industry Visibility
Medium
High

0.872

*

(0.402)

Organiational Celebrity (t-1)

0.734
0.979

Awards

†

(0.222)

0.575

0.167

1.014
-1.801

CEO-focused PR
Tenure
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions
Industry Distinctiveness

**

p<=.001;

**

*

*

0.142
-0.504

0.337

0.247

(0.270)

(0.074)

-0.003

0.199

(0.170)

(0.104)

0.436

0.356

(0.287)

(0.118)
†

(0.547)

a ***

***

(0.144)
(0.150)

-1.595

***

(0.072)
†

(0.570)

-0.775

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness

1.502

(0.345)

(0.563)

Strategic Distinctiveness

1.481
(0.205)

**

(0.388)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

**

(0.260)

(0.476)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

0.693

*

-0.239

***

***

†

**

*

(0.117)
***

(0.434)

-0.007
(0.101)

†

p<=.01; p<=.05; p<.10

b

Standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Pooled OLS estimation models on split samples and cluster-robust VCE.

e

Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2.14. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity –
Strategic Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e
Model 1
Awards

-0.269

Model 2
**

(0.102)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.042
0.364
0.239

0.040
0.364

(0.144)

0.239

0.363
0.239

0.016

0.022
(0.020)

Strategic Distinctiveness

-0.030

0.364
0.238

(0.014)

0.237

0.363
0.237

Model 8
**

0.032
0.360

(0.143)

0.237

Model 9
**

0.030
0.359

(0.143)

0.237

Model 10
**

0.357

(0.143)

0.359

(0.143)

0.029
0.362
(0.109)

0.237 †
(0.143)

0.235
(0.143)

0.019

0.018

0.018

0.014

0.032

0.031

0.032

0.016

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.024)

(0.025)

(0.024)

(0.024)

-0.012

-0.015

(0.013)

(0.013)

-0.023

-0.031

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.015)

-0.019
-0.033

-0.019

-0.020

(0.013)
*

(0.015)

-0.033
(0.033)

Tenure

-0.022

(0.014)
*

-0.033

-0.017

(0.014)
*

(0.015)

-0.033

(0.013)
*

(0.015)

-0.031

*

-0.017
(0.013)
*

-0.031

0.049

0.054

0.057

0.058

-0.057

0.058

0.048

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.072)

(0.074)

-0.079

-0.079

-0.074

-0.085

-0.081

(0.150)

(0.149)

CEO-focused PR

0.087

(0.149)
*

(0.043)

0.088

(0.152)
*

(0.043)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness

-0.028

0.076
(0.035)

*

(0.012)

-0.024

0.088

(0.208)
*

(0.043)
*

(0.012)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
CEO-focused PR

0.064

(0.151)
*

-0.030

0.085

*

(0.013)

-0.020

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

-0.022

(0.015)

(0.014)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Tenure

0.003
(0.044)

Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure

-0.011
(0.032)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure

0.005
(0.020)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Founder Role

0.168
(0.106)

Strategic Distinctivenesse X
Founder Role

-0.092

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Founder Role

-0.105

(0.086)

(0.065)

51.11

R2

†

0.012

0.048

-0.023

AIC

*

(0.043)

(0.034)

Strategic Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

F

*

(0.015)

(0.064)

Founder Role

**

(0.035)
***

(0.109)
†

-0.276
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.110)

0.237

Model 11
**

0.031

(0.036)

†

-0.275
(0.106)

-0.033
***

(0.109)
†

-0.277
(0.103)

(0.036)
***

(0.109)
†

-0.275
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.108)
†

-0.274
(0.104)

0.034

(0.143)

(0.013)

Industry Distinctiveness

0.364

Model 7
**

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.272
(0.104)

0.034

(0.144)

*

Model 6
**

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.273
(0.104)

0.037

(0.144)

(0.019)

Model 5
**

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.270
(0.102)

0.037

(0.144)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

Model 4
**

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.269
(0.102)

(0.037)
***

(0.107)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

Model 3
**

(0.102)

(0.037)

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)

-0.269

***

48.59

***

47.42

***

23.18

***

44.05

***

43.78

***

40.82

***

39.39

***

34.70

***

36.88

***

43.85

9382.82

9384.61

9385.43

9525.52

9385.56

9387.34

9381.45

9382.19

9384.18

9387.91

9384.84

0.568

0.5687

0.571

0.478

0.575

0.575

0.574

0.575

0.575

0.575

0.576

***

N=2996; n=244
a ***
b

p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

d

Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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Figure 2.9. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – Strategic Distinctiveness. a
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Table 2.15. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity –
Industry Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e
Model 1
Awards

-0.269

Model 2
**

(0.102)

Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements

0.042
0.364

0.040

0.239

0.364

†

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions

0.239

Model 4
**

0.037
0.363
0.239

Model 5
**

0.037
0.364
0.238

Model 6
**

0.034
0.364
0.237

Model 7
**

0.034
0.363
0.237

Model 8
**

0.032
0.360
0.237

Model 9
**

0.030
0.360
0.237

Model 10
**

0.037
0.356
0.237

Model 11
**

0.032
0.361
0.234

0.029
0.363

†

0.234

(0.144)

(0.144)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.140)

0.016

0.022

0.019

0.018

0.018

0.014

0.024

0.023

0.026

0.005

(0.019)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.026)

(0.024)

-0.019

-0.019

-0.020

-0.022

-0.021

-0.018

-0.020

-0.025

-0.030

*

(0.014)

(0.013)

Industry Distinctiveness

-0.033

(0.013)
*

(0.015)

-0.033

(0.014)
*

(0.033)

Tenure

-0.033

(0.014)
*

(0.015)

-0.033

(0.014)
*

(0.015)

-0.032

(0.013)
*

(0.015)

-0.027

(0.143)

(0.013)
†

(0.015)

-0.030
(0.015)

-0.023

0.054

0.057

0.058

0.058

0.056

0.050

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.065)

(0.074)

-0.079

-0.079

(0.150)

(0.149)

0.087

-0.080

-0.092

(0.150)
*

(0.043)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness

0.087

-0.096

(0.150)
*

0.063

-0.035

(0.150)
*

0.087

(0.177)
*

0.084

(0.043)

(0.030)

(0.043)

(0.043)

-0.016

-0.014

-0.015

-0.002

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.013)

(0.011)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
CEO-focused PR

(0.032)

-0.021

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

-0.030

(0.016)

(0.020)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Tenure

0.006
(0.040)

Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure

-0.035

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure

-0.020

(0.032)

(0.026)

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Founder Role

0.164
-0.111

Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Founder Role

-0.176

(0.100)

*

(0.089)

51.11

R2

†

(0.087)

Industry Distinctivenesse X
Founder Role

AIC

†

0.041

Industry Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR

F

†

(0.014)

0.049

CEO-focused PR

†

(0.013)
†

(0.064)

Founder Role

***

(0.108)

(0.144)

Strategic Distinctiveness

**

(0.035)
***

(0.108)
†

-0.276
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.110)
†

-0.278
(0.010)

(0.035)
***

(0.109)
†

-0.276
(0.103)

(0.036)
***

(0.109)
†

-0.274
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.108)
†

-0.274
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.272
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.273
(0.104)

(0.036)
***

(0.107)
†

-0.270
(0.102)

(0.036)
***

(0.107)

(0.144)

-0.269
(0.102)

(0.037)
***

(0.107)

CEO Celebrity (t-1)

Model 3
**

(0.102)

(0.037)

Organizational Celebrity (t-1)

-0.269

***

48.59

***

47.42

***

23.18

***

44.05

***

43.78

***

40.82

***

39.94

***

36.87

***

43.75

***

38.59

9382.818

9384.61

9385.43

9525.52

9385.56

9387.34

9381.45

9383.06

9385.03

9385.22

9382.58

0.568

0.5687

0.571

0.478

0.575

0.575

0.574

0.575

0.574

0.577

0.576

***

N=2996; n=244
a ***
b

p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

c

Year fixed effects were included in all models.

d

Fixed effect estimation.

d

Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.
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a

Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.15 (Model 11).

Figure 2.10. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – Industry Distinctiveness. a
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Table 2.16. Summary of findings.

Hypothesis

Logit, FE
Strategic
Industry
Distinctiveness
Distinctivenss

Linear, FE
Strategic
Industry
Distinctiveness
Distinctivenss

Supported

Supported

Organizational Celebrity
H1a: Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions --> (+)
Organizational Celebrity
H2a: Ratio of Posititve Competitive Actions -->(+)
Organizational Celebrity, is (++) for highly
Distinctive Competitive Actions

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

H3a: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive
Actions -->(+) Organizational Celebrity, is (++) for
Organizational-focused PR

Supported

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Supported

Not Supported
(different slopes)

CEO Celebrity
H1b: Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions --> (+)
CEO Celebrity

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

H2b: Ratio of Posititve Competitive Actions -->(+)
CEO Celebrity, is (++) for highly Distinctive
Competitive Actions

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(different slopes)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

H3b: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive
Actions -->(+) CEO Celebrity, is (++) for CEOfocused PR

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

H4: Ratio of Posititve & Distincitve Competitive
Actions -->(+) CEO Celebrity, is (++) for shorter
CEO Tenure

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

H4: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive
Actions -->(+) CEO Celebrity, is (++) for CEOFounder

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(different slopes)

Not Supported
(n.s.)

Not Supported
(different slopes)
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CONCLUSION
Celebrity is a common phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova et al.,
2006) and has become an important aspect characterizing how organizations and their members
are perceived by stakeholders and constituents. Within the context of organizational studies,
celebrity has been investigated at the individual – e.g. CEOs and entrepreneurs – and
organizational levels – e.g. Apple and Tesla. Being in the media spotlight, these social actors
become celebrities known and acclaimed by audiences, within and beyond the boundaries of
their industries.
Emerging from previous literature on celebrity is an initial appreciation of how individual
and organizational celebrity are achieved, and a preliminary understanding of their distinctive
effects on organizational outcomes. However, research on this important social approval asset
has suffered from two main shortcomings. First, research on the construct at the individual- and
organizational-levels has largely proceeded independently, despite suggestions the two may be
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006). This has hindered our understanding of how celebrity
develops at one level or the other, how celebrity at different levels co-evolves over time, and
what are the performance implications of achieving celebrity across multiple organizational
levels.
Second, empirical research on celebrity at both the individual- and organizational levels
has mostly focused on investigating the effects of these important social approval assets on
organizational processes and outcomes. Sparse attention, however, has been given to empirically
investigate the theoretical claims on the antecedents of individual and organizational celebrity.
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In this dissertation, I attempted to address these gaps in the literature. In Essay 1, I
theorize how and why celebrity emerges at different organizational levels, how individual and
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time, and with what performance implications. In essay
2, I empirically investigate the antecedents of CEO and organizational celebrity and find only
partial support for the theoretical claims about the role of distinctive actions in fostering the
development of celebrity.
Multiple theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions are offered in this
dissertation. First, I contribute to theory on celebrity by identifying factors affecting the
development of celebrity at different organizational levels. I suggest that celebrity development
at different organizational levels is affected by the resonance of individual or organizational
attributional frames. In doing so, I highlight how celebrity is developed through a co-creation
process where multiple social actors are involved (i.e. journalists, organizations and
organizational members), and move the theory a step further in understanding why and how
celebrity emerges at different organizational levels. Second, I contribute to theory on celebrity by
developing a theoretical model that addresses how individual and organizational celebrity coevolve over time, and by discussing the potential performance implications of these two
constructs when occurring together. Third, I advance current theory on celebrity by empirically
investigating whether “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions” (Rindova et al.,
2006: 59) affects the likelihood of achieving this important social approval asset at both the
individual- and organizational-level, and investigating the role of organizational communication
materials in facilitating the adoption of specific attributional frames in the media coverage.
Fourth, building on the role of media as the distinctive characteristic of celebrity (Rindova et al.,
146

2006) and on established standards in the study of organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010), I
used a complementary measure of CEO celebrity. The use of measures for the operationalization
of CEO and organizational celebrity that are complementary, yet distinctive from the
operationalization of other social approval assets, has the potential not only to facilitate future
research on the construct at multiple levels, but also to foster our ability to identify the
idiosyncratic characteristics of their development processes, as opposed to the development of
other important social approval assets such as reputation or status.
Overall, the media affect organizational actions and performance by impacting the
prominence and perceptions of organizations and their members in the public mind. Knowing
how media coverage of business events comes about is the first step for managing it. To this
extent, the theoretical model and empirical study developed here bare important practical
implications, as they lend understanding of under what circumstances the media adopt the
individual and organizational frames that foster the development of celebrity at different
organizational levels. I expect that the theory developed here will increase our understanding of
these important social approval assets and stimulate further research on the relationship between
individual and organizational celebrity and their influence on organizational performance.
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